


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**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Arms Control

27 OCTOBER 1987

ARMS CONTROL

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TURKISH ARTICLE SOUNDS NOTE OF CAUTION ON DISARMAMENT

52002583 Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 3 Jul 87 p 8

["Views, Thoughts" column article by Orhan Kilercioglu: "NATO and Risks"]

[Text] The first warning about risks before the agreement in principle reached between the United States and the Soviet Union over the dismantlement of medium and short-range nuclear missiles in Europe goes into effect came from NATO Commander-in-Chief Barnard Rogers sounded the first warning on risks. The general's warnings, which came at a time when he was preparing to hand over his command to his successor, stem from his knowledge of the realities. In several of my writings in the past, I have described concerns over nuclear disarmament and stressed that any agreements reached without having a force to replace the nuclear deterrent would carry certain risks.

Everyone wants a world at peace and free of arms. But can such a peace be realistically achieved today?

Recently, a U.S. State Department official proposed in Congress "to reduce nuclear weapons and eventually to eliminate all classes of weapons from the map of Europe."

It is hard to predict the outcome of the talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact with regard to the limitation of strategic arms. However, it is true that President Reagan is moving too fast to sign a nuclear disarmament accord. General Rogers pointed out this fact and demanded that "an agreement which touches upon another nuclear system based in Europe be rejected" and advised that "extreme care be taken." Because Rogers knows the balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact very well; for years, he had to respond to the questions and demands of NATO allies about how the existing vacuum would be filled and he often did not hide his concerns and had to offer the nuclear umbrella as a defense to neutralize any threats.

Why FRG Gave Green Light

The significance of West Germany's decision to give the green light [to a nuclear disarmament pact in Europe] at a time when NATO allies have to offset the Warsaw Pact's superiority in conventional forces with nuclear means has still not been understood]. At a time when the question of how this gap will

be bridged remains unanswered, it is also quite difficult to understand the American approach.

There has been growing speculation that this approach is the result of Reagan's efforts to "regain his prestige and to use his remaining time in office to his advantage" in the aftermath of the damage caused by the Iranate affair.

Indeed, all Western defense ministers have begun pressuring their governments to increase their defense budgets in order to fill existing gaps. It is yet unclear how NATO countries with limited economic means will finance this additional burden at a time when military aid is being cut.

Superior Soviet Firepower

At present NATO has 121 divisions against 230 Soviet divisions. Although the NATO divisions enjoy superior personnel, more critically, the Soviet divisions are equipped with heavy armored vehicles and enjoy superior firepower and logistic capabilities.

In Central Europe, Soviet and NATO forces are generally even in terms of personnel. However, NATO has 9,700 tanks against the Soviets' 14,000, 3,400 artillery units against the Soviets' 6,900 and 2,395 warplanes against the Soviets' 3,420. The gap in numerical superiority is worsened by the more modern weapons the Soviets have. In addition to gaps in low air defenses and anti-tank warfare capabilities, continuing deficiencies in materiel and ammunition supplies and problems in external resupply capabilities, the Soviets also have superior capabilities to attack rear areas. A comparison of the details of the forces of the two sides justify existing concerns even more unequivocally.

This being the case and given the allies' obvious need for the nuclear umbrella, it is evident that nuclear disarmament entails major risks.

The situation is even more serious for Turkey. Given the significance of its responsibility to defend the Straits, the question of how Turkey's needs will be met remains unanswered. At a time when American aid to Turkey remains inadequate and in dispute, the American administration's decision to forgo the nuclear umbrella is incomprehensible. Moreover, it is unknown how it will neutralize the risks that will emerge as a result of that decision.

In conclusion, if the Reagan administration views a nuclear disarmament pact as a way regaining what it has lost, let us state from the outset that it is making a mistake.

Today, NATO faces new risks in addition to the ones that already exist.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS ON U.S. 'OBSTRUCTIONIST' STAND ON CW

LD211652 Moscow TASS in English 1615 GMT 21 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow, 21 Aug (TASS)--By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

A comprehensive ban on chemical weapons has been discussed by various international forums and at negotiating tables for many decades.

Many dramatic developments accompanied the struggle over the status of chemical warfare agents. Some inspired the hearts of people with hopes that these weapons would be outlawed, others marred the prospects of reaching a corresponding agreement.

There have recently emerged real prospects for a successful completion of the talks on the total prohibition of warfare agents at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

By displaying bold approaches to the problems under discussion and discarding the outdated "logic" of the arms race, the Soviet side came out at the talks in favor of the earliest destruction of all stockpiles of chemical weapons and the elimination of the technical facilities which produce them.

The Soviet programme stipulates, in particular, that all sides should disclose the whereabouts of the enterprises engaged in the production of chemical weapons and elaborate procedures for eliminating the production base.

The USSR has announced the cessation of the production of chemical weapons and is building a special facility to destroy them. Participants in the Disarmament Conference were invited to visit the facility.

The large-scale initiatives of the socialist community at the Geneva conference removed a number of obstacles in the way of achieving a mutually acceptable agreement on chemical weapons.

Ways to resolve the most fundamental questions have been found and the text of many provisions of the would-be agreement has been agreed upon thanks to the efforts applied by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Geneva.

The recent Soviet initiatives concerning effective verification were of special significance. The Soviet side announced that it would proceed at the talks from the need for the legal endorsement of the principle of mandatory inspections on challenge without the right to refuse such inspections.

The American side has for years rejected any agreement on chemical disarmament under the pretext of the "difficulty of verification."

The head of the U.S. delegation to the talks once said that verification of agreements on chemical weapons was absolutely essential, but impossible, thus ruling out the possibility of U.S. joining the agreement.

Washington claimed later that the agreement was impossible due to the Soviet Union's refusal to allow on-site inspections.

The groundlessness of such insinuations has become obvious now.

The Soviet party to the talks seeks to dispel the other parties' mistrust and invite Western representatives to join an honest dialogue on questions of securing the interests of all nations.

The U.S., however, is far from always ready for such a dialogue and often tries to discard the principle of equality and equal security of the sides in handling problems of chemical disarmament.

As a result of the American side's obstructionist stand in Geneva, the forecasts by experts about the possibility of concluding an agreement on chemical weapons as early as in 1987 have been put in question.

The U.S. and its allies claim that the USSR has an overwhelming superiority in chemical weapons. Such assertions are lies as it is Washington which erects main obstacles in the way of the total destruction of chemical warfare agents and the elimination of their production base.

The facts are that Washington banks on chemical rearmament with the deployment of extremely dangerous binary munitions stuffed with nerve gas, rather than on chemical disarmament.

The U.S. Administration believes that chemical weapons most fully comply with the requirements of the Pentagon's overall strategy for preparing a war far from U.S. territory.

American strategists naively think that if U.S. chemical weapons are used in Europe or in the Far East, the United States will not become a target of a retaliatory chemical strike due to the tactical and technical properties of chemical warfare agents.

It seems that the Pentagon's illusory aspirations to achieve advantages in a chemical war are the chief factor that determines the obstructionist stand of the American delegation to the talks on chemical disarmament.

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CSO: 5200/1636

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

PRAVDA VIEWS CHEMICAL WEAPON BAN PROPOSALS IN CD

PM251143 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Aug 87 Second Edition p 4

[S. Romanov article: "On the Path Toward a Chemical Weapon Ban"]

[Text] The latest session of the Geneva Disarmament Conference is nearing its end. Within the framework of this forum, talks are being held to conclude a convention on banning chemical weapons, a convention intended once and for all to ban and destroy both this barbaric type of mass destruction weapon and its industrial production base. Many provisions of the convention have been successfully agreed upon during the talks, in which 40 states have been taking part. The real breakthrough occurred in 1986 as a result of a series of Soviet initiatives which resolved fundamental questions that had been preventing agreement on the convention's provisions.

The main question unresolved when the conference's present session began was the problem of inspections on request in the event of suspicion that the convention was being violated. Essentially the differences amounted to whether a state that is suspected of violating the convention is obliged to allow an international inspection group access to any site on its territory for inspection or whether it has the right to refuse to allow such an inspection in exceptional circumstances (for example, with regard to access to a facility unrelated to chemical weapons but of importance from the viewpoint of security interests).

The proposal set out by E.A. Shevardnadze in Geneva on 6 August was aimed at resolving this question, which had long been discussed unsuccessfully at the Disarmament Conference. It was stated that, guided by the interests of achieving the earliest conclusion of a convention, the USSR delegation to the talks on banning chemical weapons proceeds from the premise that it is necessary to give legal backup to the principle of mandatory inspections on request, with no right to refuse such inspections.

It should be particularly stressed that the USSR's policy statement on mandatory inspections on request contains no conditions to devalue it. The USSR believes that the request for inspections may be submitted in respect of any facility or site on the territory of the state party to the convention, or under its jurisdiction or control, and also belonging to a natural or legal person of the state party to the convention in any place where it is suspected that the convention has been violated. The state under suspicion has no right to refuse inspections on request. In this respect inspections on request must be carried out within 48 hours of the request's submission.

To rule out the possibility of using inspections on request to discover secrets unrelated to chemical weapons, we have proposed the elaboration of corresponding procedures governing their conduct. For example, it will be necessary to agree that the instruments used by the international inspectors during the inspection correspond strictly to their duties and that the state under suspicion has access to all such instruments for inspection purposes.

Our proposals take the maximum account of the idea expressed last year by Britain. This concerns the possibility of the state under suspicion proposing alternative measures for the conduct of the inspection to prove that it is not in breach of its commitments. Such measures may include the visual inspection of the site of the convention's alleged violation, the testing of the air around it, and so forth. However, the time limit for agreeing upon the inspection procedures, according to our proposal, should not be more than 48 hours from the submission of the inspection request. If the state that suspects a failure to observe the convention is not satisfied with the alternative measures proposed, the inspection will go ahead as prescribed.

On 6 August the Soviet Union put forward initiatives on other questions connected with the banning of chemical weapons. To create an atmosphere of trust, the USSR invited the participants in the chemical weapons talks to visit the Snikhany military installation to see standard models of our chemical munitions and the technique for destroying chemical weapons. Such a visit is planned for October. We also stated that at some time in the future we will invite experts to a special chemical weapons destruction enterprise which is being built in the region of Chapayevsk city.

Our proposals, submitted in accordance with the principles of the new political thinking, are self-explanatory. It should be particularly noted that in practical terms they unravel the most difficult problems that have occurred at the talks during the elaboration of the convention.

The talks therefore have now entered the final stage. If the other states taking part in them display the political will for agreement and do not create obstacles, a convention on banning chemical weapons will become a reality in the very near future.

In this connection, mention must be made of a negative aspect that is seriously complicating the course of the talks. At a time when there is a very clear prospect of concluding a convention, the United States is still showing no readiness to abandon plans to begin the full-scale production of binary chemical weapons. Does it have to be spelled out that this is incompatible with the world community's goal of the general and complete banning and destruction of chemical weapons?

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CSO: 5200/1636

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR COMMENTATOR VIEWS CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN MIDDLE EAST

TAF42046 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1630 GMT 14 Aug 87

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Another round of U.S.-Soviet consultations on banning chemical weapons has been held in Geneva. Progress was achieved on certain issues. Practical steps to dispel both sides' suspicions were discussed. It was decided that Soviet experts would visit the U.S. installation for dismantling chemical weapons in Tulsa and U.S. experts would be invited to visit the Soviet installation we are building near Chapayevsk. In the view of observers, progress in the Soviet-U.S. talks will contribute to the success of the Geneva disarmament conference, where an international charter is now being prepared on a comprehensive, efficient, and enforced ban on chemical weapons and on the elimination of the industrial infrastructure for their production.

What is the connection between this process and the interests of Israel and the Middle East in general? It seems to us that there is a direct connection there. Although official spokesmen in Israel claim that Israel possesses no chemical weapons, there is reliable information which contradicts these claims. For example, the British JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY published an article at the beginning of the year entitled 'Israel's Third Option.' The first option is conventional warfare and the second is nuclear warfare. The JANE'S commentator believes that chemical weapons for mass destruction have not only been developed in Israel, but are being produced and stored in IDF and Air Force depots. JANE'S notes further that a chemical weapons potential has also been developed in other countries of the Middle East, including those countries that are in a state of war with Israel.

It is also known that Israeli scientists are developing new types of chemical weapons. On several occasions the Israeli press has published evidence of toxic substances being tested in prisons. One substance, in the form of a spray, leaves (ulcers) that do not scab on the skin and harm the eyesight.

Even if we believe the official spokesman in Jerusalem, that Israel does not have chemical weapons, this does not mean there is no danger of such weapons being used in the area. After all, the weapons of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force are stored in Israel. Many sources have learned that there are also nerve gas stores at the disposal of this force. According to the agreement on storing weapons, the IDF can also use this gas in the event of an emergency.

Of course, many matters are shrouded in obscurity on the issue of the Middle Eastern countries' chemical potential, and this is natural; all countries keep such information secret. However, in an atmosphere of suspicion and lack of trust among the area's

nations -- as a consequence of 40 years of warfare -- any doubt can only be for the worst. Let us recall the tension on the northern front at the end of last year. The press published a CIA report according to which the Syrians were preparing a chemical offensive against Israel, and the entire area was on the brink of exploding. Afterward it turned out that it had all been a journalists' canard and the tension dissipated, but what would have happened if somebody in the Arab world were to lose his cool after some information was published on Israel's chemical potential?

All the Middle Eastern countries are sitting on hills and mountains of destructive weapons, including, apparently, those that are not so conventional. Every side knows the size of its own potential; it can only guess the size of the other side's potential but, of course tends to assess it according to maximal measurements. This is how every act of the other side that can be, at least theoretically, interpreted as a preparation for war, is assessed. This applies even more if the reference is to moves that can be interpreted as preparation for nonconventional warfare. It is only natural that under these conditions all the sides are prepared, at any moment, to order the launching of a retaliatory blow using all the means at their disposal.

We can therefore conclude that the Middle East is now a zone where there is a special danger of an increase in acts of hostility to a substantively new stage, which could include the use of chemical weapons. Israel is more vulnerable than the Arabs, both because of its relatively small size and because of the high concentration of the centers of government and economy. Therefore it seems to us that the Israeli public has a direct interest in supporting every effort aimed at achieving an international agreement which would ban chemical weapons and eliminate the industrial infrastructure for their manufacture.

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CSO: 5200/1629

GDR MILITARY JOURNAL ON U.S. BIO WARFARE PLANS

East Berlin AR-ARMEERUNDSCHAU in German No 8, Aug 87 (signed to press 23 Jun 87) pp 60-63

[Article by Dr Guenter Schenke: "Genes in the Gunsight"]

[Text] Fifteen years ago, the USSR, Great Britain and the United States concluded a "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and Their Destruction." By the end of 1985, 103 states, including the GDR, had ratified the treaty, and additional states had signed it. All this notwithstanding, the Pentagon is again and again looking for "reasons" to undercut the convention and improve its arsenal of weapons of this type.

Six years after that convention took effect, in the year 1981, no lesser person than the American secretary of state at that time, Alexander Haig, felt constrained to proclaim for all to hear that positive evidence was now available for the use of biological-chemical toxic weapons in Kampuchea by the USSR and her allies. On leaves and stems of plants, scientists had found tiny droplets, a sort of "yellow rain," which contained fusarium toxins. The poisons--the product of molds which form naturally in spoiled foods and occasionally also cause mass sicknesses--could also be propagated in bioreactors. This possibility for the biotechnological mass production of fusarium was sufficient reason for Haig to accuse the political and military adversary of their employment. Why?

The "yellow rain" came at just the right time for the Pentagon to prompt the American Congress to approve increased funding for research in the field of chemical, biological and toxic weapons. It was not until years later that the "yellow rain" phenomenon found a simple explanation. The scientist Matthews Meselson of Harvard University determined that the generated droplets stemmed from the intestinal content of bees which drop their excrement in flight. In addition, the quantities of toxin noted were minimal, less than 1 microgram per drop. Based on this, Cologne Professor of Genetics Herbert Kneser calculated that a human being would have to consume circa 1000 grams of the sprayed substance before he would die of poisoning, and, not without sarcasm, he voiced the opinion that "it would be more effective to drop stones from the sky." But at that point the expedient lie concerning the Soviet poison threat had already served the intended purpose.

In the current fiscal year, the U.S. Department of Defense has \$58.5 million available to it just for research on biological warfare. According to data provided by the Pentagon, 19 government facilities and 100 universities and firms are involved in research work on the military utilization of modern biotechnologies, part of the necessary funding of which is not even included in the defense budget but rather flows into civilian research projects. American scientist Professor Susan Wright hit the nail on the head with her characterization of this dangerous development: "Allegedly in order to prepare defense measures against possible enemy weapons systems, the United States has begun a substantial biological research and development program. Additionally, when public funds for biological research for civilian purposes are cut, the support by the military is increased, so that biologists are subjected to growing pressure to orient their activity toward military objectives."

Advances made in the level of knowledge in gene technology and other biotechnologies have naturally also evoked the interest of the Pentagon. And once again "valid reasons" are found to demonstrate an alleged lead by the Soviet Union in these fields, so as in this way to justify the current work being done by the United States for the military utilization of the latest scientific findings. An entire series of articles in the WALL STREET JOURNAL was based on the allegation that gene-technical work was being carried out in the USSR for the purpose of manipulating a relatively harmless cold virus with genes of the cobra poison. This virus could kill all human life, with the exception of the "immunized Russians."

As nicely as all this might conform to the image that leading Americans have of the USSR as the "evil empire," just as transparent is the intent behind the dissemination of allegations such as this. And so the U.S. Army, with full-page ads in scientific journals, asks molecular biologists to turn over "research proposals of military significance" in the fields of virus sicknesses, bacterial poisons, defense against nerve poisons, and low-molecular poisons, to the "U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command" in Fort Detrick. Being sought there is that which has been falsely attributed to the Soviet Union: a means for countering the greatest "drawback" of biological weapons--their possible effectiveness on friendly troops and one's own civilian population. More clearly stated: the certainty of being able to use biological weapons in a military conflict with impunity. Reflections on this are at an advanced stage. The "gene-technically controlled plague" has moved into the field of armament-political thinking and the objectives of aggressive circles of the military-industrial complex of the United States as well as influential military personalities. It is for this reason, too, that there are plans, at a cost of millions of dollars, to expand the Dugway test grounds in Utah, which was created especially for the testing of chemical and biological weapons. And again an American cabinet member, under the protective cloak of "defense research," steps forward to plead for the utilization of modern biotechnologies for military purposes. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger declared: "For biological warfare, the genetic engineering field opens up a great number of possibilities."

Normally harmless organisms which do not cause sicknesses can be so altered that they become highly toxic or cause sicknesses which the adversary cannot treat or cure. Other agents which are today still considered too unstable for storage or biological warfare could be transformed into an adequately effective agent."

In the year 1985 the Pentagon carried out over 70 experiments which were associated with gene technology. Their cost amounted to \$68 million. In a report dated May 1986 to a committee of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, the Department of Defense pointed out the following: Gene technology methods are such as to make the biological war an effective variant of combat operations for the first time. What is referred to here is a genetically altered virus which endures cold and heat equally well, which settles in the cell and forces it to work for it or be destroyed.

Other research is focused on hybrid technology (production of mixed cells from cancerous cells and antibody-producing cells) and on the objective-oriented manipulation of the genes [hereditary substance] of microorganisms. Vaccines and further developed diagnostic methods for the rapid identification of biological agents are to serve for alleged defense against biological and chemical agents. The adaptation of human nature to future battlefield conditions is likewise not overlooked, and methods are being sought for the assessment, control and altering of human behavior.

In this connection, the "U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command" (TRADOC), in a working paper written in the year 1984, stated: "It is possible that we will need human engineering in order to immunize our soldiers against stress, just as we immunize them today against sicknesses."

As untenable as such scientific objectives in the field of "human engineering" (technology for the manipulation of the human being) may be, it must nevertheless be assumed that antihuman experiments on the deliberate interference with [encroachment on] the hereditary substance of the human being will be conducted for military purposes. The certainty of this can easily be concluded from what has long been a common practice in the United States in this area. Between 1949 and 1969, far more than 200 bacteriological experimental operations were conducted in the United States by special units of the U.S. Army. Among other things, they had as their goal the transportation of the most poisonous of all materials, the botulinus toxin, by means of so-called aerosols. In the form of tiny drops (diameter 0.5 to 5 thousandths of a millimeter [0.5 to 5 micrometers]), this poison, 1 gram of which can kill 10 million people, hovers in the air, sometimes for days. Aerosol experiments were also conducted by the U.S. Army in the New York subway--unbeknownst to the populace, needless to say.

Characteristic of their antihuman nature when profit interests are at stake is the circumvention of international treaties by the most aggressive circles of imperialism. This "gap" in "defense research" was found in the B-weapons convention of the year 1972. The rapid advance in the level

of knowledge in the field of biotechnology therefore requires constant international controls. In September 1986 the second control conference of the B-weapons convention, attended by experts from 67 countries, was held in Geneva. In view of the most recent developments in the bio sciences (including gene technology), the majority of the participants, among them the representatives of the socialist states, favored an effective implementation of the treaty. That is in keeping with our basic position that this probably most silent and insidious of all wars--that fought with biological agents--is a crime against humanity.

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CSO: 52000017

USSR JOURNAL ON NATO MILITARY-POLITICAL COORDINATION

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 87 (signed to press 16 Mar 87) pp 34-42

[Article by G. Kolosov: "Military-Political Aspects of the West European Integration Process"]

[Text] Among the diverse forms of cooperation of the European Community states, military-political, military and military-industrial relations occupy a somewhat exclusive place. Formally, in accordance with the provisions of the treaties of Rome and the evolved practice of Community activity, questions of the coordination of military-political courses, coordination of the military planning and activity of the armed forces and joint arms production are resolved outside of its institutions, predominantly in NATO or within the framework of specially formed mechanisms not directly related to the EC. Nonetheless, the ongoing expansion of such cooperation can hardly be regarded in isolation from the general process of West European integration if only because all the leading countries of the Community participate actively therein.

A further enhancement of the role of the EC in the system of international relations was observed in the past decade and the first half of the 1980's. At the same time, however, the intensification of the interrelationship of its participants is extending increasingly to the military-political sphere, although the latter remains predominantly the "domain" of the national governments and NATO. The endeavor of the ruling circles of the West European states to achieve in inter-Atlantic relations positions enabling them to exert a greater influence on their development as a whole and to use the increased economic potential of the EC as an instrument of political influence providing more fully for the possibilities for the pursuit of an independent policy is contributing to the changes.

Of course, as the 27th CPSU Congress observed, "it is difficult to expect that the evolved complex of economic, military-political and other common interests" uniting the West European "power center" and the United States "could be severed under the actual conditions of the modern world. But within the confines of this complex Washington should not expect the uncomplaining obedience of its ally-competitors to the American diktat, the less so to the detriment of their own interests."

The changes in this direction are not always proceeding incrementally, opposite trends are also observed brought about largely by the disagreements among the members of the EC over how relations with the United States should be built. Upon determination of their positions in respect of this issue in the mid-1980's the West European states have encountered a number of new, complex problems connected primarily with the need to give an answer to the far-reaching plans advanced by the U.S. Administration providing for the enlistment of the West European countries in the SDI, a stimulation of their participation in NATO and a toughening of relations with the Soviet Union.

Atlantic and European Trends

In the mutual relations of the West European countries and the United States the significance of the two said trends and the actual relations ensuing therefrom is dissimilar and the degree of independence of the West European states in the development of military-political, military and military-industrial cooperation and the terms of its combination with overall NATO activity differ.

The greatest degree of unity is manifested in determination of the main military tasks of the North Atlantic alliance, the significance of the American nuclear assurances and coordination in the military-political sphere. Disagreements, on the other hand, are usually observed when it comes to the correlation of the proportional participation of West Europe and the United States in the bloc, the corresponding roles of the American nuclear forces in Europe and the general West European forces and the combination of military integration in NATO and military-political cooperation on the European continent. Differences have been revealed recently in the approaches of the governments of West European countries to the proposals of the U.S. Administration concerning their participation in realization of the "star wars" program. As a whole, greater concern than in Washington is being displayed here at the exacerbation of the international situation, the increased level of military confrontation on the continent and the prospects of a further spiraling of the arms race. All these factors are largely influencing the positions of the ruling circles of the West European states.

The question of the ultimate goals of military-political cooperation and its correlation with the activity of NATO arose with special keenness in the middle of the current decade, when the U.S. Administration unfolded before the allies its plans for the realization of the SDI and advocated a concentration of their efforts on an enhancement of the level of the general forces. As a result they were faced with a choice. Acceptance of the American proposals would increase appreciably their dependence on the United States. In this case military partnership between them would subsequently also be basically of a subordinate nature compared with common efforts within the NATO framework. On the other hand, attempts to display greater independence are fraught with the risk of Washington's strict retaliatory response. This applies particularly to nuclear arms.

During discussion of the prospects of military-political cooperation in West Europe considerable attention is being paid to the possibility of the

formation of a so-called West European "deterrent force" based on the nuclear potential of Britain and France or even on the basis of just the French arsenal. Realization of such a possibility is linked, as a rule, with hopes for reduced dependence on the United States in the provision of "nuclear deterrence" in Europe and the formation here of an autonomous military-political system. However, en route to this there is a whole number of appreciable obstacles which have to be taken into consideration in the West European capitals.

Primarily such a "deterrent means," whether in the form of the French or coordinated Anglo-French nuclear forces, is not as yet something practicable, even less something contributing appreciably to a strengthening of the positions of the European NATO participants.

Further, these forces are not comparable in terms of their potential with the U.S. nuclear arsenal and, in the opinion of many politicians and military specialists, cannot serve for the participants in the North Atlantic bloc as a substitute for the latter. Their further buildup, on the other hand, and orientation toward the performance of the corresponding military assignments in Europe are directly contrary to the interests of nuclear arms control.

Finally, the very formulation of the problem of a West European "deterrent means" in the plane of the further development of the military-political cooperation of the West European states inevitably entails the question of the role of the nonnuclear participants in such cooperation and their attitude toward this means. The endeavor of the leaders of France and Britain to ensure national control of the nuclear forces, even if they are performing some "West European" functions, is not contributing to increased interest in, for example, the FRG and Italy in the plans for the formation of such a "means of deterrence," and, on the contrary, any mention of the possible enlistment in the realization of such plans of the FRG causes a highly negative reaction in other countries of the continent.

As a result the European participants in NATO's military organization are continuing to rely on the United States in the provision of nuclear assurances, regarding the prospects of the formation of their own "deterrent means" at least as a hypothetical possibility which may be realized only in the event of an appreciable rapprochement of the military-political courses of the leading West European states. For this reason they attach the main significance to participation in NATO's nuclear planning and assistance to the United States in the buildup of nuclear arms on the territory of countries of the Old World. The deployment here of Pershing 2's and cruise missiles increased even more the Atlantic aspect of the West European states' relations in the nuclear sphere.

The statements of official American spokesmen emphasize that continued pursuit of the "flexible response" strategy requires a considerable buildup and qualitative rearmament of general forces, primarily of the European members of the North Atlantic alliance. If this is not done in the immediate future, nuclear weapons will remain "the sole reliable deterrent means" (1).

Simultaneously Washington is making it understood that the allies' reluctance to assume the main burden of realization of these plans could lead to a serious complication of inter-Atlantic relations as far as the withdrawal of some of the American troops. Such pressure, in the words of NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, "shocked" the West Europeans, who consider their present "contribution" quite substantial.

After all, of the armed forces ascribed to NATO, the bloc's European participants were at the start of the 1980's even supplying up to 90 percent of ground forces and tanks, 70 percent of naval and 70 percent of air forces. Furthermore, their share of total military spending has grown (2). Such an appreciable participation is prompting them to seek a bigger role in the structure of the military command and the realization of various programs, from logistics through the elaboration of strategic doctrine.

Indeed, cooperation in these spheres is effected largely in accordance with the overall plans of the bloc and depends on the decisions of its command. At the same time, however, while not rejecting the U.S. demands for an increase in NATO's nonnuclear potential, the West European allies fear the consequences of such an increase in the level of confrontation and are attempting to coordinate their positions for the purpose of pursuing a common policy in relations with the Americans. This cooperation is particularly noticeable in the military-political sphere.

Development of Military-Industrial Cooperation

An essential trend has shown through in the past 20 years in the approach of governments, primarily of the defense ministries, and also the firms of a number of West European states to the production of new arms--an increased orientation toward the development of mutual military-industrial cooperation as an integral part of the integration process. It is aimed at an increase in the arsenals of its participants and as a whole corresponds to NATO plans for an increase in the bloc's aggregate military potential. At the same time its expansion is being catered for by the increased possibilities of the corresponding sectors of industry and a strengthening of mutual relations. In this plane this cooperation is contributing to the consolidation (in respect of the United States) of the positions of its participants in arms production.

The development of partnership is also predetermined by the endeavor of the governments and, particularly, the military departments to compensate for the rapidly increasing expenditure on the development and manufacture of new systems. Thanks to the use of such a method, they hope to secure large-scale orders, reduce production costs and overcome technical difficulties in the creation of modern arms.

The main joint programs are being implemented by the states with a highly developed military industry, primarily France, Britain, the FRG and Italy. The conditions of the development of such programs are the large-scale national military production, the high level of R&D and, of course, the interest of the governments and business in the creation of the latest arms.

France has most military-industrial cooperation agreements with West European partners: in the 1970's-start of the 1980's it was participating in 15 large-scale joint programs of the development and production of arms and military equipment. The involvement of the FRG and Britain, which participated in 13 and 11 West European projects respectively, was somewhat less. Italy participated in 4 programs, Belgium and Holland accounted for 2-3 programs (3). And although the association of Spain, Norway and Greece with military-industrial cooperation has been observed in recent years, their participation is as yet confined mainly to the acquisition of licenses and arms purchases.

Also highly dissimilar is the role of such cooperation in different spheres of military production. It is particularly pronounced in aviation-missile industry. Long-term relations between France, Britain, the FRG and Italy have been established and the biggest joint programs have been developed precisely in the manufacture of military aircraft, helicopters, tactical missiles and aircraft engines. This is largely explained by the rapid growth of the cost of the said arms and their technical complexity. The biggest program has been the production by Britain, the FRG and Italy of the Tornado multipurpose fighter-bomber. But before its completion even the three governments were attempting to switch to the development of a new fighter designed in the 1990's to replace those currently in service with the air forces. The defense ministries began discussion of the possibilities of a joint program and the coordination of the military-technical specifications of the new aircraft. Spain joined the consultations in 1984.

A new area of cooperation in the development of aviation-missile technology attracting increasingly great attention is the creation of carrier rockets and communications satellites. And although the activity of the European Space Agency (4) is as yet confined to civilian projects connected with the launch of commercial satellites, the experience accumulated in this field could also be used for military purposes. The leading role in the creation of the Ariane carrier rocket is performed by France, and the proportional participation of French firms in the program constitutes, as a whole, almost two-thirds. The launch of two dozen various satellites, the first of which was put into orbit in 1983, has been planned for the 1980's.

The composition of the participants in the space projects testifies to the highly significant interest in an expansion of partnership in the given field primarily of the leading aviation-missile firms actively involved in military-industrial business. As a result of the cooperation which has been developing rapidly in recent years the grounds are appearing for the development, particularly by France, Britain and the FRG, of military studies in the sphere of space technology.

The proposals put forward by Paris concerning the implementation of the broad-based Eureka program are geared as yet, according to official assurances, to the development of research in the civilian sectors into the latest technology and will lead in the event of their realization to a qualitative rise in the level of cooperation of the West European states in this sphere. This could also correspondingly influence the development of their military-industrial partnership, primarily in the production of communications and observation facilities and the upgrading of computers and data processing systems.

The expansion of military-industrial cooperation has led to the point at which whereas in 1977 joint projects accounted for approximately 10 percent of the total cost of the arms and military equipment made in the leading West European countries, at the start of the 1980's this proportion had reached 20 percent. There has been a simultaneous increase in the exchange of military technology and purchases of licenses (5).

In line with the upgrading of military-political cooperation the contours of an intergovernmental center of its planning and coordination are appearing increasingly distinctly. At the same time the main obstacles in the way of the completion of the creation of such a center are the as yet continuing orientation of the participants in the process toward the pursuit of national programs in many spheres, the continuing struggle for leadership between Britain and France in the shaping of such a mechanism and, finally, the difficulties of its combination with the activity of the military-industrial cooperation coordination bodies functioning in NATO.

At the start of the 1980's the participants in the European Program Group (EPG) (6) were able to notably expand the exchange of information concerning military production and rearmament plans and to reach an agreement on the implementation of a number of joint projects. And although the EPG's activity is as yet confined predominantly to the discussion of various recommendations concerning the expansion of military-industrial cooperation and the coordination of the long-term planning of the production of new arms, the participation therein of France lends particular significance to these efforts, testifying that the intergovernmental system of coordination also corresponds to the current practice.

A principal aim of the participants in West European military-industrial cooperation was and remains a strengthening of their positions in respect of the United States. But this goal has yet to be achieved. The correlation observed in the past decade in the inter-Atlantic trade in weapons and military technology--1:10 in favor of American suppliers--remains practically unchanged.

This situation has been brought about primarily by the United States' continuing leadership in the production of the majority of the latest types of weapons and also active resistance to a change in this correlation in favor of West Europe on the part of American military business. The problem is also that all the leading participants in West European military-industrial cooperation, including France, are maintaining and expanding even close relations with the United States in arms production. Such dependence on the Americans in R&D is essentially increasing as a result of the association of Britain, the FRG and Italy and also firms of other countries with realization of the SDI program.

Formation of a System of Military-Political Coordination

There has been a marked expansion in the past 15 years in West European states' relations in the military-political and military spheres. While developing in accordance with the overall goals of NATO, this process does not

at the same time preclude the West European participants' formulation of a number of tasks corresponding predominantly to their own interests, which differ from American interests. To a certain extent this has led to the formation of a more or less autonomous grouping within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance, which can be seen in the example of the activity of the main centers of military-political coordination--the Western European Union (WEU), the NATO Eurogroup and the system of consultations of the European Community states on security issues which is taking shape.

Abiding by treaty commitments, the members of the WEU--Britain, France, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg--have right until the expiry of the term of the treaty in 1998 to coordinate their actions in the military-political sphere and render one another military assistance in case of necessity. The WEU remains as yet the sole multilateral military-political alliance of West European states with a treaty basis and structure corresponding to some extent to its mission. The WEU Council, which meets twice a year at the level of foreign ministers or their deputies (and as of 1984 with the participation of defense ministers also), is empowered, besides coordinating positions, to adopt decisions concerning a revision or the lifting of the restrictions on arms production in the FRG. As a result Bonn has obtained permission to create practically all types of conventional arms, including missiles, bombers and large-scale warships and submarines. The lifting, primarily with the consent of France and Britain, of restrictions in effect earlier is contributing to an appreciable buildup of the military power of the Bundeswehr.

In addition, the WEU is intended, in accordance with treaty commitments, to play a considerable part in the exchange of military information among its participants and contribute to the development within its framework of military-industrial cooperation. Proposals aimed at converting the WEU into a coordinating center of West European military-political and military-industrial cooperation have been put forward repeatedly at sessions of its assembly--the representative body of the union in whose work members of the parliaments of the seven states participate.

Advocating the realization of such plans are primarily the French leaders, who consider an important advantage of such partnership its autonomy in respect of NATO. In recent years the French Government has repeatedly proposed a transition to discussion at sessions of the WEU Council of problems of strategy, various aspects of strengthening military power and an intensification of joint arms production. Paris does not conceal here the fact that it regards the formulation of a common approach to the United States a principal purpose of such coordination.

Ultimately the other members of the organization have accommodated the French proposals to some extent. At the council session in October 1984 the participants' foreign ministers noted in a joint statement the usefulness of regular consultations on military-political issues. This decision, incidentally, which has yet to be fully realized, was largely brought about by the discussion which had developed in NATO over the United States' demands for a "redistribution of the burden" in the buildup of conventional arms.

The proposals concerning the union's conversion into the leading body of West European military-political cooperation cannot be fully realized without considerable changes in policy contributing to the achievement of its participants' greater independence in this sphere. In practice they have all, aside from France, been oriented as of the start of the 1970's toward the development of West European military partnership in the NATO Eurogroup.

The activity of the latter reflects, from the viewpoint of its members, the optimum combination at this stage of the trends of Europeism and Atlantism in their military-political courses. On the one hand the Eurogroup was, as established at the time of its creation, to be the center of coordination of cooperation in the military-political, military and military-industrial spheres, contributing to safeguarding the interests of the West European allies in relations with the United States and the consolidation of their positions in NATO. At the same time its tasks were from the very outset largely dictated by the "need" for an increase in the European share of expenditure in NATO and the development of the interaction of the armed forces in compliance with the plans of the bloc's military command. The Eurogroup was regarded by its founders by no means as a basis for the formation of an independent West European association but essentially as an auxiliary mechanism of NATO, albeit possessing a certain autonomy. All this conditioned the particular features of the functioning, sphere of activity and structure of the Eurogroup and the limits of the expansion of the interrelationship of the states incorporated therein.

In practice its principal tasks amount to the coordination of the participants' contribution to the buildup of NATO's power, the financing of joint programs of modernization of the bloc's infrastructure, the increased interaction of the national armed forces and the complementariness of arms and military equipment. The members of the Eurogroup coordinate a number of aspects of national rearmament programs, annually report on the adoption of new weapons systems and are fulfilling their commitments pertaining to the 3-percent growth of military spending in real terms.

However, the statements concerning the close coordination of the programs do not mean that the Eurogroup has already become a center of cooperation in which regulation of the size of military budgets, planning the organizational development of the armed forces and coordination of the participants' policies are practiced.

Recently the Eurogroup has increasingly often been accommodating the United States' demands for additional contributions by the West European allies for a strengthening of NATO's so-called "nonnuclear defenses". A program of modernization of the bloc's infrastructure has already been developed, the construction of new ammunition dumps is under way and other measures designed to enhance the efficiency of the general armed forces are being prepared.

The development of West European military-political cooperation based on the Eurogroup is largely being hampered by the French Government's refusal to take part in its activity explained in Paris by the Eurogroup's close ties to the NATO military organization and the specifics of the assignments which it carries out.

The attempts to develop the military-political cooperation of states within the EC framework call attention to themselves also. Thanks to the political integration in the Community and, particularly, the functioning of the system of foreign policy coordination, the conditions have been secured at the present time even for the participants' transition to a study of certain military-political matters and their formulation of the appropriate consultation procedure. In any event, as distinct from the WEU and the Eurogroup, considerable experience has been accumulated in the Community of the advancement of joint initiatives, which could serve as a definite basis for the development of military-political cooperation.

True, a special military-political coordination center defined by treaty commitments has yet to be created in the EC. Although various plans for the formation of such a mechanism have been put forward repeatedly by Europeist politicians and specialists, they have yet to be realized, and in fact steps toward the establishment of military-political cooperation have by no means followed the outlines contained in these plans. In practice there has been a gradual expansion of the sphere of foreign policy consultations of the Community states and the incorporation therein initially of security issues and, subsequently, of certain aspects of military-political problems.

The "generator of ideas" here is the European Parliament, which has repeatedly passed resolutions calling on the governments of countries of the EC and its bodies to finally switch to the institutionalization of military-political relations. Such proposals, albeit more guardedly, are beginning to be put forward at government level also. A step of considerable importance in this direction was taken at the London meeting of foreign ministers in October 1981. The representatives of the FRG and Italy put forward the joint proposal that in the course of the subsequent formation of a European union military-political questions be a subject of discussion in the Community for the purpose of the formulation of a common approach to them. Despite the fact that the proposal was not at that time actively supported by the remaining participants, a compromise decision was reached in accordance with which the desirability of the study within the EC of "global political aspects of security" was recognized.

The common political line of the Community at the time of discussion of problems of security and disarmament at international forums has shown through for a whole number of years now. This coordination of actions is particularly noticeable in the United Nations. The joint position is usually expounded by a spokesman of an EC state in a statement prepared and coordinated in advance. Such statements are of an equivocal nature, but they reflect the main thrust of the participants' policy and are frequently dictated by the interests of opposition to the socialist community. At the same time at the start of the 1980's the Community states supported in the United Nations the prevention of the spread of an arms race in space. Policy was also coordinated in the course of the Madrid meeting and the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe.

On the initiative of the governments of France and the FRG a new attempt was made in the mid-1980's to speed up the development of military-political

relations in the EC. Endeavoring to remove the objections of the opponents of such cooperation, Paris and Bonn put forward the proposition concerning progress toward the creation of a European union "at two speeds". In accordance with this, states most interested in the discussion of problems of security and this military-political issue or the other could switch to the coordination of positions separately. The draft treaty on European union presented by France and the FRG at the Milan summit (June 1985) provides for the establishment of such coordination for the sake of the increased independence and "affirmation of the distinctiveness" of the Community. Consultations on military-political issues in the WEU prior to the formation of a special center are not precluded.

These propositions were reflected in the draft political cooperation treaty approved at the session of the European Council in Luxembourg (December 1985): the EC countries undertook within the framework of the pursuit of a "European foreign policy" to develop coordination in the solution of security questions. The role of this cooperation and its forms are to be determined by such factors as the general state of the Community countries' relations with the United States and differences on problems of the functioning of NATO and also to depend on the readiness and capacity of the EC participants themselves for formulating common approaches to military-political questions. Endeavoring to avoid additional difficulties on the path of West European integration, the ruling circles of countries of the Community are deliberately not separating the limited military-political cooperation which has begun from foreign policy cooperation, unwilling to create the impression of a difference between its goals and the tasks of military-political partnership in NATO. This cautious approach is considered the most acceptable at the present stage of development of the EC.

The ongoing expansion of cooperation aimed as yet mainly at a buildup of the aggregate military power of West Europe within the framework of the North Atlantic alliance is by no means contributing to a lessening of tension and a lowering of the level of confrontation on the continent. It is primarily necessary in evaluating this process to proceed not from the officially declared goals of partnership but from its actual results, regardless of whether they are achieved thanks to the coordination of the military efforts of West European states directly in NATO or outside of this bloc, in "autonomous" centers. At the same time, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that a most important stimulus for the development of the military-political relations of the West European states is the aspiration to consolidate their positions in respect of the United States and safeguard their own interests.

FOOTNOTES

1. See J. Stewart, "Conventional Defense Improvements: Where is Alliance Going?" (NATO REVIEW No 2, 1985, p 2).
2. NATO REVIEW No 5, 1981, p 14.
3. DEFENSE NATIONALE, May 1983, p 20.

4. The European Space Agency was formed in 1975. It includes (as of 1986) France, the FRG, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Spain (EC members) and also Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and Norway.
5. See T. Taylor, "European Defence Cooperation," London, 1984, p 21.
6. The Independent European Programme Group was set up in 1976 in a composition of the members of the NATO Eurogroup and France.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987

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CSO: 1816/8

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS BLAMES U.S. FOR 'FAILURE' OF CD TALKS

LD202115 Moscow TASS in English 2043 GMT 21 Aug 87

[Text] Geneva August 20 TASS -- The work of the Geneva conference on disarmament has entered its final stage. Many delegations sum up in their reports the preliminary results of the work of this major forum on disarmament issues. Stanislaw Turbanski, head of the Polish delegation, drew attention in his speech to the initiatives of socialist countries which might lay a solid foundation for serious talks on the priority points of the agenda of the conference. The speaker singled out the latest Soviet proposal on preventing the arms race in outer space and banning chemical weapons.

The head of the German Democratic Republic's delegation, Ambassador Harold Rose, supported the proposal, put forward by the Soviet foreign minister, on setting up a special group of scientific experts to draft recommendations on the structure and functions of a system of verification of any possible agreement on non-testing nuclear weapons. He stressed that that initiative made it possible to start practical work at the conference on that important problem.

At the same time, most participants in the conference noted that because of the position of the USA and its closest allies talks at the conference's current session failed on such important issues as a ban on nuclear tests, termination of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, prevention of a nuclear war and barring the arms race from outer space.

The speech by head of the U.S. delegation Max Friedersdorf provided further proof that the United States was not going at the future session of the conference to remove artificial barriers in the way of talks at this body covering major issues, including those on nuclear disarmament.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: CSCE DELEGATES ON STATUS OF TALKS

Pact, NATO Stands Compared

LD241956 Moscow TASS in English 1841 GMT 24 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 24 TASS -- Consultations between representatives of the Warsaw-Treaty and NATO countries on working out a mandate for talks on cutting the armed forces and armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals will be resumed in Vienna in September, and next stage of the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will begin.

In this connection Viktor Tatarnikov, representative of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, member of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting and at the consultations between Warsaw-Treaty and NATO countries, said the following in an interview with a TASS diplomatic correspondent:

"Inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons, with tactical strike aviation among them, in the subject-matter of talks, and the determination of a cutback area are the most complex problems which give rise to principled differences."

"The stand of the Warsaw Treaty countries is simple and understandable: It envisages a cut in all components of land forces and tactical strike aviation of European countries as well as in the respective forces and systems of the United States and Canada deployed in Europe, together with their organic armament and combat hardware in conjunction with tactical nuclear systems".

"If one compares this clear-cut stand with NATO's concept of the talks, a strange detail strikes the eye: NATO would like to exclude tactical nuclear systems, including tactical strike aviation, from the talks".

"No provision for mutual reductions is made either. Practically, they speak of only land forces and of removing 'disbalances' at the expense of the Warsaw Treaty countries".

"Common sense suggests that it is impossible to consider 'dual-purpose systems' at different talks".

"If one really strives for the establishment of stability in Europe, it is essential to reduce all components of both land forces and tactical strike aviation in their aggregate".

"It is impossible to seek the elimination of the offensive potential of the sides (as NATO countries' mandate envisages it) without reducing or eliminating tactical nuclear systems, including tactical strike aviation".

"Representatives of NATO countries state that the Soviet Union ostensibly has superiority in tactical nuclear arms and strike aviation. The Soviet Union and its allies precisely suggest eliminating disparities that exist in some components on the one and the other side".

"Why then does the other side refuse to consider these components? Apparently because, in actual fact, the United States and NATO have superiority in those components".

"At the talks the Warsaw Treaty countries are prepared to consider and eliminate disparities during a reduction in all components of land forces and tactical strike aviation. Not only in tanks, as NATO countries suggest, but also in tactical aviation, nuclear artillery, tactical missiles, and other types of arms and combat hardware".

"Stability in Europe is indivisible. It cannot be either conventional or nuclear. What the Europeans need is overall stability, excluding first of all the threat of nuclear war in Europe", Viktor Tatarnikov emphasized.

Kashlev on Progress, Problems

LD251411 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 25 Aug 87

[Report by Yuriy Borisovich Kashlev, head of the USSR delegation to the CSCE meeting in Vienna]

[Excerpts] The Vienna meeting of representatives from the 35 states taking part in the all-European conference began in November last year at the foreign ministerial level. This was the third all-European meeting since Helsinki, and it was intended, if possible, to conclude this meeting on 31 July. However, as radio listeners are no doubt aware, this was not achieved.

Conditions for the work of this forum were favorable. There were, first, the many peace initiatives by the USSR, starting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement of 15 January last year, and including our very latest initiatives which permit the elimination of a whole class of nuclear missile weapons. Second, there was an activization of political life in Europe over recent months. As is well-known, Thatcher, Chirac, and other political figures visited us, and everyone was talking about the growing significance of Europe in world affairs. The favorable atmosphere also facilitated what is now going on in the socialist countries and the USSR -- the process of restructuring, democratization, and glasnost. All this refers back to the problems under discussion within the framework of the all-European process. All this had a positive influence on the work of the all-European forum in Vienna.

Nonetheless, the work has been drawn out, and on 31 July, we, the heads of the delegations, spoke at the final meeting, not the ministers, as was planned. How is this explained? First of all, it is explained by the fact that two lines clashed on the issue of whether the all-European process should be dealing with problems of security, disarmament, and military detente, as the core of the all-European process. Certain NATO countries, headed by the United States, take a different line. They have for many years now been trying to remove the questions of disarmament, security, and military detente from the all-European process. This NATO line has been squashed with great difficulty, and the questions of security, disarmament, and military detente have been retained within the framework of the all-European process.

How has this been expressed? As is well-known, for 2 years before the Vienna meeting, the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe was under way in Stockholm, a conference that is an important component of the all-European process. And now a preliminary accord has been reached that, after Vienna, this conference which we are provisionally calling Stockholm II, will continue its work with all the 35 states participating in the all-European process. Military measures of confidence will be discussed there, such as the notification of major exercises and troop movements, invitations to observers, and so on.

Furthermore, new consolidations have begun in Vienna between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries on the start of talks on disarmament in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Western countries and particularly the United States did not want these talks to bear any relation to the all-European process. These would be separate talks between blocs. We, the socialist countries and the neutral countries, objected to this, and even within NATO there was not a united stance. And now a resolution has been passed -- it still has to be confirmed in the final document of the Vienna meeting -- to the effect that after Vienna, seemingly in 1989, new talks are to begin on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Twenty-three countries -- the 7 countries of the Warsaw Pact and 16 countries from NATO -- will play a direct part in them, but these talks will be held within the framework of the all-European process.

As yet, not everything in this field has been settled and different points of view are clashing. The socialist countries want armed forces and conventional weapons to be discussed in conjunction with tactical nuclear weapons. Those in NATO are categorically against this. For the time being, they do not want to discuss tactical nuclear weapons. But at least there is some movement, albeit slow, on military issues.

For various objective reasons, we have not yet completed the meeting as planned before the end of July. A decision has been adopted to resume the meeting on 22 September and to do all possible to bring it to an end in December this year. The Soviet delegation will be going to the next stage with many constructive proposals. On the other hand, we are not having our toes stepped on. Those who would like to interfere in our internal affairs and in the cold war spirit, to organize attacks on us, we will resolutely repel. All this is taking place within a fairly critical struggle, but all the same, the task set before us is to find all opportunities for common views that unite the positions of the 35 countries and to elaborate a final document which would contribute to the all-European process and would develop it further for the good of all the peoples of Europe and North America. Our delegation will do everything in its power for the all-European meeting in Vienna, the third since Helsinki, to end in success for the benefit of our foreign policy and that of other peoples.

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USSR: GEN TATARNIKOV PREVIEWS CSCE TALKS

PM041151 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Sep 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major General V. Tatarnikov: "Vienna: Crucial Stage Ahead"]

[Text] The next stage of the meeting of representatives of the 35 states participating in the CSCE begins 22 September in Vienna. The consultations among 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO countries on formulating a mandate for talks on reducing armed forces and armaments throughout Europe — from the Atlantic to the Urals — will resume at the same time. The Vienna meeting is to finish elaborating an all-embracing final document, and the consultations involving the 23 countries are to formulate a mandate on the basis of which it would be possible to commence talks on the very important problem of reducing armed forces and armaments on a Europe-wide scale.

But what are the state of affairs at and the prospects for the consultations among representatives of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries?

Both sides have now submitted their draft mandates for the future talks. The discussion has identified the areas where there exist both divergent approaches and certain points of contact. The incorporation of tactical nuclear weapons and tactical strike aircraft as well as ground forces in the talks and the definition of the zone of forces and arms reductions are among the most difficult problems causing fundamental disagreement.

The position of the Warsaw Pact states is straightforward and clear. It envisages the mutual reduction of all the components of European states' ground forces and tactical strike aircraft and of the corresponding U.S. and Canadian forces and facilities stationed in Europe, together with their armaments and combat equipment, in conjunction with tactical nuclear weapons.

As for the NATO states, their concept does not envisage mutual reductions. Essentially they are only concerned with ground forces and the elimination of "imbalances" at the expense of the Warsaw Pact states. The NATO countries would like to exclude nuclear weapons, including tactical strike aircraft, from the talks.

Why are the USSR and its allies upholding the idea of mutual reductions? Because it is the reduction of both military-political alliances' military potentials that is the backbone of the entire program for disarmament on a broad Europe-wide scale, since they exceed reasonable defense levels. Only radical reductions of armed forces and armaments can lead to the achievement of stability in Europe.

Moreover, the logic is such that without reducing such components as nuclear weapons and tactical strike aircraft it is essentially impossible to establish stability. Tactical nuclear armaments and strike aircraft are a very important part of the potential for delivering a surprise strike and carrying out major offensive operations. They cannot be separated from ground forces since they form part of their structure, being "dual-purpose weapons," which can be used as both nuclear and conventional weapons.

Common sense suggests that it is impossible to consider the same weapons — "dual-purpose weapons" — at different talks. If one is really aiming to establish stability in Europe (as defined in the NATO draft mandate), then it is necessary to reduce all components and ground forces, tactical nuclear weapons, and tactical strike aircraft as a package. The West, on the one hand, declares its desire to seek to eliminate the offensive potential of the sides but, on the other hand, refuses to reduce tactical nuclear weapons and tactical strike aircraft. But it is these components that constitute the offensive potential.

The NATO countries often say that the USSR has a superior number of tactical nuclear armaments and aircraft. Since these fears are being expressed (although they are obviously far fetched), the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states are proposing the elimination of inequality in components wherever it exists, on either

side. So why is the other side refusing to consider these components? Evidently because, in reality, it is the United States and NATO that have superiority in these components. That is why they do not want the talks to embrace tactical nuclear weapons and strike aircraft.

The Warsaw Pact states are prepared to eliminate the inequalities in the actual process of reducing all armaments components, and eliminate the inequality not only in tanks, as the NATO countries have proposed, but also in tactical aircraft, nuclear artillery, tactical missiles, and other types of armaments and combat equipment. Only then, of course, can one talk about the achievement of stability in Europe.

There is also fundamental disagreement at the consultations on the question of the area of the reductions. The Warsaw Pact states' document points out that it must include the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, including the archipelagoes and island territories of the European states in adjoining sea areas, as well as the entire territory of Turkey. This is a perfectly natural and valid demand since both troop contingents and military equipment, which must also be reduced, can be stationed on these territories.

The United States and the NATO countries would like to cut down the zone of reductions, eliminating part of the Turkish Armed Forces and their military bases on Turkish territory. In fact, the realities are such that Turkey is a NATO country possessing very large groupings of armed forces, which has a considerable impact on the balance of forces in Europe. The military potential of another state and talks participant -- the United States -- is stationed on its territory. This potential poses a direct threat to the USSR and its allies and absolutely must be included in the reductions. Equal respect for the security interests of all the talks' participants demands such an approach.

Unfortunately, there are other serious differences between the two sides' positions. But the results of the last stage of the consultations showed that accords on the mandate for future talks are possible. They can be reached through joint efforts. The NATO countries' representatives were compelled to go along with the idea of holding talks on disarmament within the framework of the CSCE, on which the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries had insisted from the start. The West has accepted the concept of reducing armed forces and armaments (until recently they were only concerned with eliminating the imbalance). It is important that both sides have acknowledged the need above all to eliminate

the surprise attack potential. These are reassuring signs of the sides' interest in talks on reducing military potentials in Europe.

But the main tasks at the consultations have not yet been solved and a mandate has not yet been formulated. A crucial stage lies ahead and there will be hard, painstaking work comparing the positions reflected in the Warsaw Pact and NATO draft documents. The success of this final part of the consultations will depend mainly on what kind of solutions to key problems the NATO countries' representatives bring to Vienna and to what extent they actually display a readiness to successfully complete the work on a mandate at the next stage of the consultations, in order to be able to start, in 1988, the actual talks on reducing armed forces and armaments throughout Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

As for the Warsaw Pact countries, they are ready for constructive work.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR SUPPORTS EUROPEAN NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL-FREE ZONES

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 6, Jun 87 pp 87-89

[Article by Sergei Kortunov under the rubric "Peace and Cooperation for Europe": "Important Steps to Europe's Peaceful Future: On the Creation in Central Europe of a Nuclear-Free Corridor and a Zone Free of Chemical Weapons"]

[Text]

The creation of zones free of all types of weapons in various parts of the world is an important component of the set of measures directed at fully eliminating nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century. It can be described as a system of coordinates, as vertical and horizontal cross-cuts of the struggle to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. In this system all the measures of disarmament, supplementing and bolstering one another, should lead to a single goal, a world without wars and weapons.

Large oases of security would appear in bright colours on the map of the world if zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons were created in various parts of our planet, especially in regions where the concentration of such weapons has reached dangerous limits, and this would undoubtedly promote the process of gradually ridding the world of weapons of mass annihilation.

The creation of such zones in Central Europe would be especially important because it is there that the two mighty military-political alliances—the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO—stand face to face.

As is known, in October 1986 representatives of the GDR Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and the FRG Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) came out with an important political initiative concerning the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe. This joint proposal applies to a part of the territory of the FRG, the GDR and Czechoslovakia (roughly 150 kilometres along the territory of each of these states) along the lines separating NATO and the Warsaw Treaty from which all types of nuclear arms should be withdrawn.

It is suggested that the governments of the GDR, Czechoslovakia and the FRG take part in the talks on the creation of such a corridor. They could also discuss other aspects concerning the geography of the zone and questions of international verification of compliance of the sides with their commitments concerning the proposed corridor. It is planned, in particular, to set up permanent centres of control and data exchange concerning the weapons systems subject to withdrawal from the corridor.

The joint initiative of the two parties which exist in countries with different social systems which hold different stands on many other important issues has evoked widespread response. It was supported by the

Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The social democratic parties of NATO countries, the liberal and conservative parties of Scandinavia and prominent politicians in many countries have come out in favour of creating a nuclear-free corridor.

This idea, as readers know, was first voiced by the late Prime Minister of Sweden Olof Palme. He had given much time and effort to this lofty aim: to create conditions that would be conducive to lessening the danger of a military confrontation in Europe in whose densely-populated industrial areas the concentration of arms, especially nuclear arms, has reached an exceptional degree.

Take, for instance, West Germany: in terms of the number of US nuclear warheads deployed there that country is the unenviable leader not only in Europe but in the whole world. A nuclear Sword of Damocles hangs over Europe which is the common home of the peoples of more than 30 countries. A human error or a technical failure, not to speak of a military conflict, can result in a dire catastrophe. The corridor three hundred kilometres wide was proposed precisely in order to lessen the danger of such a thing happening.

What would its effect be? At the least it would reduce the temptation to instantly resort to using these terrible weapons in the event of a military conflict. But mainly, besides raising the threshold of nuclear confrontation, this corridor would become a zone of trust while in the future the nuclear-free zone could be spread to the whole of Central Europe and the entire continent.

After the success in Stockholm where an accord was reached on confidence-building measures on the territory from the Atlantic to the Urals, this making a sneak attack less probable than in the past, the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in accordance with the adopted principles would make it possible to further extend the time of political notification and reduce the level of the strike potential. That is why the creation of such a corridor would be a genuine confidence-building measure in full conformity with the spirit of Stockholm. Since not only nuclear arms but all types of weapons used both in a nuclear and a conventional modification would be withdrawn from the corridor running along both sides of the line separating the military blocs, this measure would even transcend the framework of the Stockholm accords.

The new Soviet proposal on the speediest separate solution of the problem of American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe gave a fresh powerful impetus to efforts to place on a practical plane the joint proposal of the SED and SPD to create a nuclear-free corridor in the centre of Europe. This is so because if an agreement is signed on the elimination of the Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR, as was stated by Mikhail Gorbachev on February 28 this year, will withdraw its enhanced-range tactical missiles not only from the projected nuclear-free corridor but also from a bigger zone of Central Europe encompassing the territories of the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Neither would such nuclear missiles remain on West German territory. This would be a patent and concrete step towards lessening the war danger, scaling down the threat of the outbreak of an armed conflict and towards a subsequent total elimination of nuclear arms in Europe. In April this year the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia officially addressed the FRG government with a proposal to start negotiations on creating a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe. The Soviet Union backed up that proposal.

The proposal to set up in Central Europe a zone free of chemical weapons is another major initiative designed to ensure European security. This proposal was made by the GDR and Czechoslovakia in September 1985 when they proposed to the FRG to open trilateral talks on the creation of such a zone that would include first of all the territories of these three countries.

The initiative of the GDR and Czechoslovak governments is in line with the proposal by the Warsaw Treaty countries, made in January 1983, to rid Europe of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union supports the proposal by the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia and regards it as a contribution to the joint efforts to rid the peoples of the European continent of the chemical menace. If a zone free of chemical weapons were created in Central Europe the USSR would be ready to guarantee and respect the status of this zone. Such a guarantee would enter into force if the United States acted likewise.

There is no doubt that the GDR and Czechoslovak proposal, if accepted, would help reduce the risk of a chemical war in the densely-populated part of Europe and become a powerful incentive for spreading the zone free of chemical weapons to the entire European continent.

The FRG government turned down this proposal on the pretext that chemical weapons should be banned on a global basis while regional limitations would only further complicate "the issue of verification which is difficult as it is". This logic, however, obviously runs counter to that country's stand on the question of banning chemical weapons and first of all to its support for Washington's plans to develop binary chemical weapons and stockpile them in Western Europe.

The following is also important. The technology of manufacturing binary weapons and the specificities of stockpiling their components immeasurably complicate verification. More than that, it might even be impossible. Typically, those who campaign for unlimited verification prefer to keep mum when this aspect is raised.

The proliferation of chemical weapons is in nobody's interests because the result is a greater risk that such weapons will be used and an obvious threat to humans and the environment.

This danger would be non-existent if there were a convention on the total prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. But for a number of reasons, and through no fault of the USSR, such an agreement is yet to be signed. So, along with speeding up the Geneva talks, which should remain the prime goal, it is expedient to make use of new additional possibilities, first of all in terms of resistance to the proliferation of chemical weapons and the creation of zones free of chemical weapons.

We regard the creation of such zones also as an important step making it easier to draw up the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. This could also be facilitated by certain other analogous measures. The non-proliferation of chemical weapons could also be assisted by a commitment by all states not to hand over chemical weapons to anybody, not to acquire chemical weapons and not to deploy such weapons on foreign territory.

As we see it, taken together all these measures should help strengthen the regime of non-use of any chemical weapons and expedite the adoption of an accord on a universal ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.

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USSR JOURNAL ON NFZ IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 87 (signed to press 15 Apr 87) pp 118-121

[Article by E. Grebenshchikov: "A Nuclear-Free Zone in Southeast Asia"]

[Text] Journal reader Yu. Smirnov (Kirov) asks that we take up the problem of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia.

In the wake of other regions of the world, the surge of the antinuclear and, to take it further, antiwar movement can be observed in Southeast Asia also. At their Manila conference (June 1986) the foreign ministers of ASEAN countries advocated the conversion of the territory of their states into a nuclear-free zone, pointing to the importance of this for "ASEAN's political future". This subject is being discussed intensively by the mass media and has had big repercussions in broad public circles. In addition, it has a history also.

Back in 1971 at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the countries incorporated in the association held in Kuala Lumpur a declaration on the proclamation of Southeast Asia a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (English abbreviation--ZOPFAN) was approved. The document contained such generally recognized principles of international law as respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, renunciation of the threat or use of force, the peaceful solution of international disputes, equality and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states (1).

The "nuclear factor" did not figure openly and directly in the Kuala Lumpur declaration. However, in 1972 even the committee of high-ranking representatives of ASEAN countries specially formed for a detailed study of the principles and conditions of the creation of the ZOPFAN recommended that the participating states not permit the use, storage, production and testing of nuclear weapons within the confines of the said zone. It was noted also that the accommodation of foreign military bases on the territory of the zone was incompatible with the concept of neutralization, the more so in that nuclear warheads could be stored at these bases, without the knowledge of the local authorities, what is more.

This formulation of the question did meet with enthusiasm, to put it mildly, in influential political circles of Thailand and the Philippines, which placed above all else the preservation of close military-political relations with the United States. Giving way merely to the pressure of public opinion, they supported, more precisely, declared their support for the concept of neutralization of the region.

There is therefore nothing surprising in the fact that in subsequent years ASEAN displayed a passive approach in the plane of practical implementation of the ZOPFAN concept. And its antinuclear aspect was barely visible (2). The nuclear problem was interpreted as something wholly and fully within the province of the so-called superpowers or as something deriving from the foreign military presence in Southeast Asia.

However, under the impact of the large-scale changes which have occurred in the region the situation gradually changed. The armed intervention of American imperialism in Vietnam ended in failure, and Indochina, in the shape of three states, formed an outpost of peace in this part of the world. On the other hand, the growing aggressiveness of U.S. ruling circles on the international scene led to Washington's policy beginning to appear too dangerous and unpredictable to many of its partners. The trend toward movement away from the nuclear strategy of the United States and some of its allies intensified. This trend was manifested particularly objectively in a region neighboring Southeast Asia. The island states and territories of the South Pacific vigorously opposed the nuclear tests which had been carried out here and in August 1984 resolved to draw up a treaty proclaiming it a nuclear-free zone. Expressing the will of the electorate, the New Zealand Labor government refused American ships carrying nuclear weapons right of entry to local ports.

Such sentiments began gradually to take hold of the nonsocialist part of Southeast Asia also. The stern realities of the nuclear-space age and disquieting features in the development of the military-political situation in the Asia-Pacific region brought responsible politicians to the conclusion that consistent implementation of the ASEAN ideals and principles embodied, in particular, in the ZOPFAN concept presupposes, more, makes obligatory efforts to make Southeast Asia a nuclear-free zone. This idea had by the mid-1980's finally acquired citizenship and become a firm part of political life.

The idea of declaration of the region a zone free of nuclear weapons was supported in September 1984 at a meeting of the association's standing committee in Kuala Lumpur (3). Seminars were held in 1985 in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur devoted to study of this problem, and the initiator of the first was, furthermore, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.

However, disagreements among the partners in the grouping came to light once again. The Malaysian Government advocated the speediest practical realization of the idea, without waiting for the complete elimination of tension in the region. The Indonesian position was close to that of Malaysia. In the opinion of (Yu. Vanandi), a leader of the Indonesian International and Strategic Studies Center, which has the reputation of a government "think tank," the ZOPFAN concept implies not only the prevention of the domination and interference of any great power in Southeast Asia but also its assured

nuclear-free status (4). Many members of parliament of the country, the most influential included, also energetically insisted on this.

There is a different view of the problem in Singapore and Thailand. Their leaders persistently refer to the unsolved nature of the "Cambodia question" as an "obstacle" to the proclamation of a nuclear-free zone and speak of the "risk" of the concept since its realization would allegedly produce one-sided advantages for the USSR to the detriment of the United States. Singapore is guided here, evidently, by purely commercial considerations also. Ships of the U.S. 7th Fleet regularly call at the local port. Servicing them produces much income.

Despite the differences which came to light, in June 1986, as already mentioned, the ASEAN foreign ministers confirmed their adherence to the conversion of Southeast Asia into a nuclear-free zone. Primarily the antinuclear sentiments of broad public circles, which had undoubtedly been stimulated by the signing of the treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific (the Rarotonga Treaty) (5), were sensed behind this step. M. Kusumaatmaja, head of Indonesia's foreign policy department, has declared repeatedly that the treaty corresponds to the ideas of ASEAN and could serve as a model for Southeast Asia (6). He observed, however, that the foreign military bases located here were preventing the creation of a nuclear-free zone (7).

Although the countries of the association seemingly reached mutual understanding in principle in connection with the need for progress toward the region's nuclear-free status and experts were instructed to elaborate the specific provisions of the corresponding treaty, this did not signify removal of the disagreements.

Singaporean Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan expressed himself thus, for example: "If New Zealand's approach on the question of a nuclear-free zone spreads, this will be a real threat to all of us." At the same time, however, Indonesia and Malaysia, to judge by everything, support Wellington's policy. Such sentiments were reflected by Kuala Lumpur's NEW STRAITS TIMES, which is highly influential and close to Foreign Ministry circles. "New Zealand," the newspaper wrote, "displayed boldness in telling the world that it wishes to have nothing to do with nuclear weapons."

A unique situation has taken shape in the Philippines, where the very large U.S. bases of Subic Bay and Clark Field are located. Here the struggle against the nuclear threat is merging with demonstrations for the removal of the American military presence in the archipelago and the pursuit of an independent policy in the world arena. "The antinuclear mood," R. Simbulan, professor at the Philippines State University, declared, "is one of the strongest features of the protest movement against preservation of the bases." During the visit to the Philippines in March 1986 of D. Lange, head of the New Zealand Government, the influential social organization Corazon Aquino People's Power appealed to the country's leadership to "join with New Zealand's antinuclear policy". The statement of Deputy Foreign Minister L. Shahani concerning the government's intention of "reconsidering policy on the question of the storage of nuclear weapons at the U.S. bases and the presence

in the region of ships carrying nuclear weapons" elicited extensive comment also.

Growing militancy is being demonstrated in the Philippines by the Coalition Against the U.S. Bases and the Coalition to Make the Philippines a Nuclear-Free Zone. The first was formed in 1983 and has since this time been struggling against the nuclear threat also, the second emerged later. Approximately 15 provinces and cities of the country have been proclaimed, in accordance with the will of the population, by the local authorities nuclear-free zones. Activists of this movement have established permanent contacts with antinuclear organizations of Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Great Britain.

None other than A. Tolentino, who was foreign minister of the Philippines under F. Marcos and who can in no way be called an anti-American figure who has succumbed to the influence of "red propaganda," said in 1984 that "the Pentagon's bases furnished with offensive weapons create a threat to the Philippine people's national interests and, in the event of a crisis situation arising, they will increase the danger of the country being involved in a nuclear conflict."

Such warnings are being heard increasingly often. N. Reyes, who heads the Philippine International Relations Council, believes that the country would be the "first target of a strike given any nuclear exchange in the Asia-Pacific region" and that this would threaten its disappearance. There are, N. Reyes says, "other reasons also for a suspension of the agreement on the leasing to the United States of bases on Philippine territory, but the one adduced above eclipses all the rest" (8).

In the course of compilation of the draft constitution of the Philippines (it was approved at a referendum at the start of 1987) it was proposed incorporating in its preamble a clause on proclamation of the country a nuclear-free territory. Following discussion of this question, the members of the government commission incorporated in the draft constitution a provision proclaiming that the Philippines, "in accordance with national interests, pursues a policy of the renunciation of nuclear weapons on its territory". Of the 47 members of the commission, 26 voted for this clause, but 21 abstained, deeming necessary a complete and unambiguous ban on the deployment of weapons of mass annihilation on Philippine soil together with the removal of foreign bases.

Washington's reaction was not slow in coming. Republican Sen R. Dole termed this amendment "ominous," undermining--no more, no less--America's policy of "nuclear deterrence" in the Pacific. The Reagan administration spokesman also hastened to warn the Filipinos that they were "making a mistake of the worst kind," which, if not rectified in good time, would cost them at least \$200 million (the U.S. Congress was at that time studying the question of granting the Philippines financial assistance in precisely this amount). Washington is demanding "firm assurances" of the continued U.S. military presence in the archipelago and free access to the corresponding facilities for warships and aircraft--possible carriers of nuclear weapons.

At the start of February 1987 the State Department spokesman, giving the reason for the United States' refusal to sign the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty, asserted that "the growing number of proposals concerning regional nuclear-free zones could potentially undermine the policy of deterrence."

The socialist states of Asia have a diametrically opposite approach to this problem. The aspirations of sober-minded circles of the countries of the "six" are shared in the Indochina states. A communique of the 12th conference of foreign ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (January 1986) spoke of the need "to conclude an agreement on the creation of a zone of peace and stability in Southeast Asia, in which states with different social systems may coexist peacefully on the basis of the principles mentioned in the declarations adopted in Bandung in 1955 and Kuala Lumpur in 1971 and on Bali in 1976 and in the 1981 declaration of the three Indochina countries."

Tian Jiyun, vice premier of the PRC State Council, declared during his visit to Malaysia in October 1986 that China supports the idea of the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia, considering it a logical development of ASEAN's proposal concerning a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in this area.

The Soviet Union supports the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. This consistent policy of the USSR is enjoying growing recognition in the ASEAN countries. The unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions was welcomed here. Speaking at the end of 1986 at a seminar in the 17 August 1945 Jakarta University, R. Abdulgani, the Indonesian president's political adviser, criticized the United States' negative attitude toward the proclamation of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and similar plans in Southeast Asia. He noted the positive and constructive position of the Soviet Union, which was the first of the nuclear powers to sign the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty. This was then done by the PRC.

Questions of consolidating security--both general and regional--were at the center of attention of the negotiations held in the course of the tour of Pacific countries (March 1987) by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister. Speaking in Jakarta, the Soviet guest declared support for Indonesia's efforts "in the regional dialogue, the purpose of which is making Southeast Asia a nuclear-free zone," expressing here the hope that "this will meet with such support among the other nuclear powers also." In a joint Soviet-Indonesian statement the sides welcomed the establishment in the South Pacific of a zone free of nuclear weapons and advocated an immediate halt to all tests of nuclear weapons and the speediest conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the complete prohibition thereof.

A draft document proclaiming Southeast Asia a nuclear-free zone, which, it is expected, could be approved at the anniversary (the association will be 20 years old) meeting of representatives of the countries of the "six" at the end of June 1987, is being drawn up at the present time.

The struggle for a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia, as, equally, in other parts of the world--not only for the proclamation but also practical

realization of the idea--is a most important component of the efforts to ensure mankind's peaceful future.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "10 Years ASEAN," Jakarta, 1978, pp 240-242.
2. See N. Sophee, "The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia" ("Asia and the Western Pacific," ed. H. Bull, Melbourne, 1975, pp 132-160).
3. The standing committee, which operates in the period between annual foreign minister conferences, is made up, besides the chairman--foreign minister of the host country--of the ambassadors of the other five states.
4. INDONESIA QUARTERLY No 1, 1986, p 28.
5. See MEMO No 12, 1985, pp 99-105.
6. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 25 June 1986.
7. JAPAN TIMES, 10 August 1985.
8. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2 October 1986, p 15.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA CORRESPONDENT ON ASEAN NUCLEAR-FREE PROPOSAL

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 18 Aug 87 pp 1-5

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent L. Kuznetsov: "ASEAN: Azimuths of Policy"]

[Excerpts] The poster read: "ASEAN, for a Nuclear-Free Southeast Asia!" It was carried by a participant in a protest demonstration against American military presence in the Philippines, which was being held in front of the gates of the Subic Bay US Navy base. The poster drew attention. It was proof of the fact that the antiwar movement in Southeast Asia is extending beyond the national framework and emerging in a broader, regional, arena. Also mirrored in it are the processes taking place in the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN). The appeal with which the demonstrators were marching to the US base resounded to a certain extent at the latest conference of the association's foreign ministers, which was held in Singapore this past June.

ASEAN was formed twenty years ago, in August 1967. At that time there were different opinions about its future. American aggression in Indochina was still on the upswing then, and imperialist quarters viewed the new regional political organisation as a military bloc. However, the ASEAN policymaking documents proclaimed something different: promoting the economic and cultural development of its members was named the association's main goal. ASEAN united Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines at that time. Brunei joined it later.

ASEAN covers part of the large Asian-Pacific region, which is complex in the composition of its countries and peoples. The situation there is marked by political contradictions and a dangerous concentration of weapons, nuclear weapons included. However, a rather clear-cut line has taken shape here in recent years, which is manifest both in the mass movement and in the policies of a number of countries, namely, for eliminating the nuclear threat that has become the source of global danger. It is becoming intrinsic to the ASEAN countries as well.

Peace supporters in these countries have to surmount fierce opposition by the Pentagon, which is trying to militarise the area, drawing on a far-flung propaganda and intelligence apparatus. The West is doing all in its power to bog the grouping down in the quagmire of militarisation. Admittedly, there

are politicians in this region who would not be averse to turning their countries into an addition to the "tiger trio", as people here call what in effect has become a military alliance between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul. But sober-minded people in ASEAN ruling quarters realise what the association's subordination to the military interests of the imperialist powers can entail. By all indications, they are aware that involvement in the arms race will slow down their countries' economic development and worsen living conditions, while the growth of unemployment and rising prices are in turn fraught with social complications. People there believe, and with no less reason, that if ASEAN turns into a military bloc dependent on the West, chances for attaining economic self-sufficiency will be undermined. Lastly, there is a growing awareness in ASEAN of the need for action to remove the nuclear danger.

Such is the rationale behind the important proposal on creating a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia advanced by Indonesia and Malaysia. This question figures prominently among the political problems ASEAN is tackling. The conference of the association's foreign ministers in Singapore confirmed ASEAN's resolve to press for the creation of a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality" in this region and to continue examining the possible creation of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia.

The striving of the six ASEAN nations to make their region secure against the nuclear danger, however, causes the United States' active counteraction. The consensus of opinion is that the US keeps nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia (at its bases in the Philippines, for example). And this is one of the components of US policy. The men in Washington are, evidently, afraid of a weakening of their influence upon the region, if there is no possibility of "backing" it up with "nuclear" arguments. Hence the pressure on ASEAN.

The United States' attitude to Southeast Asia as a nuclear-free zone is clearly seen from the statement made by US Secretary of State George Shultz after the conference in Singapore, in which he warned of the difficulties awaiting the ASEAN nations on US markets. Nevertheless, the association members submitted the question of a nuclear-free zone for consideration at a summit meeting planned to be held in Manila in December of this year, the association's anniversary year.

The Soviet proposals aimed at ensuring security in Asia and the Pacific have evoked lively interest in those countries. The concrete measures proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev in his answers to questions put by the Indonesian newspaper MERDEKA have shown the public of ASEAN the sincerity and breadth of the Soviet approach to problems of Asia and the Pacific. There is a growing desire in those countries for developing relations with our country.

Preparations are now under way in ASEAN for the Manila summit meeting. They are keynoted by a search of new avenues for the development of cooperation within the framework of the association. The Manila summit is bound to give a fresh impulse to those positive trends which meet the interests of the peoples of countries in Asia and the Pacific.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS ANALYST ON U.S.-JAPANESE NUCLEAR ACCORD

LD252030 Moscow TASS in English 1755 GMT 25 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 25 TASS -- By TASS political news analyst Askold Biryukov:

A few days ago the public learnt about new materials confirming the fact of a secret Washington-Tokyo accord on the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan. These are declassified documents of the Pentagon made public by a private research organization, Nautilus Pacific Research. The list of documents includes an order issued May 8, 1984 by the then commander of the U.S. forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans William Crowe (he now serves as chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff).

The order instructed commanders of U.S. naval formations in that region to cover up instances of possible nuclear accidents or incidents involving nuclear weapons, passing them off as mishaps or incidents with conventional explosives and to remove as soon as possible practically all proofs of an incident involving nuclear weapons or other wide-scale incidents.

On the other hand, the commanders of U.S. forces stationed in a number of countries of the region were ordered through the heads of the U.S. diplomatic missions to work out jointly with the governments of those countries effective plans for preventing such incidents. The list of countries by the way includes Japan alongside Australia, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and Fiji.

Another document made public by Nautilus Pacific Research indicates that there exists a network of units in that region including special operations troops whose mission is to deal with effects of nuclear accidents or incidents involving nuclear weapons. Two such units are stationed at the U.S. naval facilities in Yokosuka and Sasebo (the two are the main base of U.S. nuclear-armed naval ships and submarines calling at Japan).

Putting these facts together, the Japanese newspaper AKAHATA stated that the United States, acting with Tokyo's tacit approval, was engaged in an illegal introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan, doing so despite the ban in effect in that country on the introduction and deployment of such weapons.

In the opinion of Tetsu Ueda, a Socialist Party MP, the newly disclosed documents imply that the United States allows of the introduction in or transit of nuclear weapons through Japan in case of emergency, despite the non-nuclear policy proclaimed by the country.

Tadashi Kuranari, minister of foreign affairs of Japan, promised MPs a full scale probe into questions raised after the publication of the Pentagon's documents. However, pronouncements made by Foreign Ministry officials on that subject indicate that more sure than not the investigation -- as was the case more than once in the past -- will not answer the main question: Whether the United States, enjoying a tacit approval of Japanese authorities, is introducing nuclear weapons in Japan or not.

For instance, Hiroaki Fujii, director of the department of North American countries at the ministry, admitted that special operations units subordinated to the U.S. Armed Forces Command in Japan did exist in that country. But then, he said that the units dealt with conventional explosives and that nuclear incident control was not their mission.

One finds that hard to believe. One can also recall remarks made by Peter Hayes, a spokesman for the American Research Organization, in an interview to the UPI news agency. Speaking of the Pentagon's directive to U.S. troops commanders in the countries of the region which instructed them to discuss with the corresponding governments plans for ensuring safety in case of incidents, he said that the conclusion prompted itself -- either Japan discussed those plans with the United States and then it cannot deny the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, or Tokyo was not informed about the whole thing, which means that the U.S. commander failed to comply with the order. There can be no other choice, he emphasized.

Of course, one can try to be patient and wait until Tokyo comes up with an official answer to those question. The trouble is that this time, too, the answer is not very likely to be plain and clear. For if Tokyo really wanted to determine whether the United States violated one of the three non-nuclear principles proclaimed by Japan it could do that quite easily and a long time ago, say, by inspecting one of the U.S. naval ships visiting a Japanese port.

However, Tokyo officials somehow prefer to rely on words from Washington which, following its time-tested practice of not confirming and not denying the presence of nuclear weapons on its naval ships and submarines, is engaged in a dangerous buildup of nuclear arsenals in the region.

/9274

CSO: 5200/1639

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS ON 13 AUGUST NEVADA NUCLEAR TEST

Soviet Embassy Protests

LD211726 Moscow Tass in English 1828 GNT 21 Aug 87

["American Nuclear Explosion -- Soviet Embassy Protest" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow August 21 TASS -- The Soviet Embassy in Washington today lodged a statement with the U.S. Department of State in connection with the nuclear explosion staged in Nevada on August 13, 1987.

The statement drew most serious attention to the fact that the yield of blast exceeded, according to information of the USSR's national seismic control services, the threshold of 150 kilotons.

This was in gross violation of the Soviet-American agreement on limiting to this threshold the yield of underground nuclear explosions, as stipulated by the 1974 treaty on limiting underground nuclear weapon tests, and represented another attempt to complicate advancement towards the solution of the question of a total ban on nuclear weapon tests.

The statement emphasized that the American blast was preceded by a propaganda campaign designed to cast aspersions on the Soviet Union, to accuse it of violating the 1961 treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater following the underground nuclear test on Novaya Zemlya Island on August 2, 1987.

That was no coincidence. The apparent aim was to cover up the fact that the U.S. exceeded the threshold in detonating its own blast.

Thus, there are no grounds for believing that the point at issue was a miscalculation, as it often happened with American military equipment.

It is becoming obvious that everything was done on purpose.

The Soviet side expected, the statement said further, that the American side would produce necessary clarifications in connection with the exceeding of the agreed upon threshold and demanded that such violations be not repeated in the future.

It was also stressed that the USSR, as repeatedly announced, was prepared to spread the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater to underground explosions, thus making it universal.

Moreover, the Soviet invitation for the U.S. to start large-scale talks on a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing under strict international control was put on the negotiating table.

State Department Denies Claim

LD242244 Moscow TASS in English 2232 GMT 24 Aug 87

[Text] Washington August 25 TASS -- TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reporting:

Journalists in the U.S. capital are discussing the statement conveyed to the U.S. Department of State by the Soviet Embassy in Washington Friday [21 August]. The statement called serious attention to an instance of violation by the U.S. of the 1974 treaty limiting the yield of nuclear explosions by a threshold of 150 kilotons -- the instance registered by Soviet seismic systems during a nuclear test in Nevada August 13.

During a briefing in the U.S. State Department Monday reporters asked for comments on the matter.

State Department spokeswoman Phylis Oakley made a statement saying categorically that the yield of the Nevada explosion, according to the U.S. data, had not surpassed 150 kilotons.

Asked about different readings of the Soviet seismic systems and pressed on the issue whether instruments, including American systems, could be trusted in such cases at all, Oakley gave reporters a rather vague answer, referring to differences in calibration and citing other reasons.

She tried to ascribe to the Soviet statement the aim of distracting attention from the Soviet nuclear test explosion on the island of Novaya Zemlya August 2 -- a test allegedly accompanied by a release of radioactivity registered beyond the boundaries of the Soviet territory.

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CSO: 5200/1639

SOVIET MILITARY ANALYST DENOUNCES U.S. TEST BAN STANCE

LD261055 Moscow TASS in English 1032 GMT 26 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 26 TASS — Military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

In the wide range of possible measures to curb the arms race a general and complete ban on nuclear weapon tests undoubtedly could become the simplest, easily verifiable and at the same time exceptionally effective step

Nuclear tests are an obligatory component of any project to create new or perfect old systems of weapons of mass destruction. Without tests the existing weapon systems would start becoming obsolete. A ban on explosions would create an obstacle for the development of new nuclear weapon systems and genuinely start the process of turning nuclear weapons into piles of useless junk.

The existing means of detecting nuclear explosions and the existing methods of distinguishing them from seismic phenomena ensure reliable verification of observance of agreements. A universal ban on explosions, while not inflicting damage to the security of any individual country, would strengthen the regime of nuclear non-proliferation and promote military-political stability in the whole world.

Apart from everything else, the attainment of agreement on stopping nuclear explosions would have immense political and moral importance and serve as an encouraging example for the concerted actions of states with different socio-economic systems in the interests of strengthening the security of all nations.

It is only the political will of the leaders of the great powers that is needed for banning nuclear tests. The attitude of political leaders and governments to the problem of nuclear explosions is actually an objective test of political maturity.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated its readiness for any forms of talks and for any variant of an accord just that this would lead to an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear explosions. [sentence as received] The USSR observed its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions for more than eighteen months. The Soviet Government is making tireless efforts to put the solution of the problem of nuclear tests into motion.

But the reaction of Washington's official representatives to the major Soviet initiatives allows for the conclusion that the present United States Administration is not interested either in a moratorium on nuclear tests, or in an international system of verifying its observance, or in a resumption of the full-scale talks on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests that were suspended by the United States in 1980.

The fact remains: During the past seven years the United States has not made even the slightest movement towards a positive solution of the question of stopping nuclear weapon tests. Moreover, Washington is constantly making its position on the problems of nuclear tests more rigorous.

The Soviet Union, displaying realism and desire to find at long last a solution to the problem of nuclear explosions, submitted in Geneva a plan of gradually approaching full-scale talks on banning tests. The Soviet side proposed that the Congress of the United States and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopt a law on limiting the yield of nuclear test explosions to one kiloton and reducing the number of such explosions to the minimum.

The Soviet initiative was received with full understanding by broad sections of the American public. As is known, decisions analogous to the Soviet proposals were adopted in the United States Congress. But the desire to continue nuclear tests at all cost prevailed in the White House. The American Administration has failed to produce any coherent reply to the Soviet proposal on a stage-by-stage advance to terminating nuclear explosions.

The world has entered a period of crucial decisions. By its actions the Soviet Union wants to bolster the hopes of the peoples that the present dangerous development of events in the world can be reversed. Instead of spending the next ten-fifteen years on the creation of new systems of weapons of mass annihilation we should jointly tackle the reduction of nuclear arsenals and in the long run achieve their total liquidation.

Agreement on the total ending of nuclear explosions could become a very important step along the road to solving this historic task.

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

SOVIET CONVENTIONAL TEST--Moscow, 25 Aug (TASS)--The Soviet Union detonated a ground blast of a conventional explosive charge at the test site in the area of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago today at 6 p.m. Moscow time. The explosion was carried out with a view to upgrading military technology. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1630 GMT 25 Aug 87 LD] /9274

CS01 5200/1639

USSR JOURNAL REVIEWS U.S. BOOK ON USSR MILITARY SUPREMACY

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 87 (signed to press 18 May 87) pp 135-137

[A. Kalinin review: "An American Specialist on 'Soviet Military Supremacy'"]

[Text] The fact that rightwing conservative forces in the United States have succeeded in converting the old myth of the USSR's military supremacy and the "Soviet threat" into a basis of the discussion virtually beyond criticism and doubt on problems of foreign and military policy is exerting a tremendous influence on the social and political situation in the country. Obviously, an American citizen who has ventured to publicly repudiate these inventions has to have outstanding boldness. It undoubtedly distinguishes Tom Gervasi, director of the New York Center for Military Research and Analysis and top specialist in military-political problems, who wrote the book in question "The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy".

Its significance is determined not only by the civic courage of the author but also scientific conscientiousness, unbiased thinking, knowledgeability and the depth and strength of his democratic beliefs. Addressing ordinary Americans, the people--"America's sole hope" (p 69)--the expert endeavors to induce his readers to reflect, affording them the necessary data for this. It is significant that it is recommended that they "take on trust what is written in the book no more than the words of the Reagan administration are taken on trust" (p 61).

We would note immediately that T. Gervasi is no "dove". In American terminology he is an "owl," a realist who believes that "the United States will always need to maintain some of the arms and forces which it has to provide for an adequate national defense" (p 41). The scholar believes in the "balance of forces" principles and the efficacy of nuclear "intimidation," while not believing the latter, however, the sole possible, optimum or reliable version of "deterrence" providing for international and national security.

The book criticizes Washington's official domestic and military policy from the standpoints of "sufficiency". "I," T. Gervasi writes, "am a citizen who believes that the United States should have a strong defense. I have, however, concluded that America already has a strong defense, has had such throughout

its history, has such today and had such 5 years ago, when the new administration assumed office thanks to assertions that the United States lacked a strong defense and promises to rearm it. In fulfillment of these promises the administration has placed the burden of unnecessary and incalculable expenditure on the American people, which is voluntarily bearing the burdens and would bear even more were there reason for this. But there is no reason" (p 3).

Having collated a large mass of data characterizing the quantity and quality of the arms of the United States/NATO on the one hand and the USSR/Warsaw Pact on the other (tabulated, these indicators are themselves of considerable interest), the author makes "an independent evaluation of the balance of strategic forces and medium-range nuclear missiles and conventional arms and the forces equipped with them." It "is in striking contrast with the subjectivist interpretation of the balance of military power which the Reagan administration is attempting to implant" (p 63).

The objective, correct calculations of the expert testify irrefutably that the United States and NATO have always had a significant superiority at all levels and sublevels; there has never been any "window of vulnerability"; the increase in the military power of the United States/NATO and the USSR/Warsaw Pact has proceeded and continues to proceed at roughly the same pace; the modernization of the Soviet armed forces at strategic level is a retaliatory measure, and at the European level, has not created any new, greater threat to the West. In his opinion, which is corroborated by the factual material which is adduced, the USSR/Warsaw Pact is inferior to the United States/NATO at all levels in terms of the most important parameters and specifications. It is sufficient to say that, in the author's estimation, as of July 1984 the USSR's reserves of nuclear weapons constituted 13,215 "deployed" units (that is, nuclear warheads which could be delivered to targets in a single firing) and 17,656 "stockpiled" units, whereas the corresponding indicators for the United States amounted to 24,783 and 37,657 respectively (pp 105, 110, 336, 338). If, however, the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain are considered, and they should, as the work emphasizes, be included in any proper balance of nuclear forces (pp 164-165), the West's preponderance is even greater.

However, preponderance, T. Gervasi believes, is not superiority. The said "imbalance has no military significance," he writes, "for parity is not necessary for creating a 'nuclear stalemate'," and the USSR has "more than sufficient" nuclear weapons "for preventing by means of deterrence United States/NATO offensive operations" (pp 180-181).

The author's scrupulous position (and he agrees with the supporters of "sufficiency" here) amounts to the assertion that "deterrence" requires neither supremacy nor even the equality of the two sides' nuclear potentials. With the achievement of a certain quantitative and qualitative level of the nuclear forces of the United States and the USSR a further arms race becomes entirely pointless from the military viewpoint. Such a level had been reached by the end of the 1960's. Now, the American scholar believes, "it is immaterial which of the superpowers has more warheads and whose missiles are more accurate" (p 29). It is impossible turning any military superiority into victory for, he emphasizes, victory in a nuclear war is inconceivable. On the

other hand, "strategic superiority is an unattainable goal," a race for which is an extremely dangerous obsession. Nuclear arsenals can and must be reduced without the least damage being done to mutual "deterrence" (pp 33, 135).

The concept which the author supports in this context is of interest. While sharing the traditional proposition according to which "'deterrence' means unacceptable risk" (p 132), the expert believes that it "has always been and continues to be based on uncertainty," primarily "has depended to a far greater extent on insufficient confidence in the reliability of the forces inflicting a first strike than on a belief in the reliability and survivability of the forces of retribution" (p 269). Proceeding consistently from his concept of "deterrence," T. Gervasi approves any measures leading to an increase in the uncertainty inherent in the latter, specifically, a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, which has been proposed by the USSR and which it observed unilaterally for more than 18 months (p 270). Granted all its unusualness, such an argument in support of a halt to the testing of nuclear weapons is entirely logical.

At the same time, however, the scholar emphatically condemns any attempts to reduce the uncertainty inherent in "deterrence" by way of a qualitative upgrading of arms or the creation of new types thereof. Having studied the numerous arguments "pro" and "contra" the SDI, he concludes that this program is baseless in the military and S&T respects, is attended by incredible costs and is essentially irrational. While not acknowledging space-based arms to be assault arms, the author describes them as "destabilizing," sharply increasing the threat of nuclear war. The side which leads in the creation of such arms would be constantly tempted to deliver a "first strike," and this temptation would be occasioned precisely by the imperfection of the "space shield," which would be meaningful only given a minimization of the number of targets to be intercepted. At the same time, however, the "lagging" side might also draw wrong conclusions from its "lagging". Both the illusion of "superiority" and the illusion of "lagging" could lead to the adoption of catastrophic, irreversible decisions.

A merit of the book is that it emphatically rejects the fatalistic concept of the arms race as an objective process generated by military-strategic and S&T imperatives and the needs of a "mature economy" which is prevalent in the West. As the monograph shows, the arms race is generated entirely by the interests and requirements of the military-industrial complex. Although the author attempts to place the responsibility therefor on both the United States and the USSR (pp 31, 41), he is forced to acknowledge: "The sad fact is that it is America which has almost always taken each new step in the arms race" (p 32).

Not confining himself to a criticism of the military-industrial complex and, particularly, the military corporations which are a part of it, the author of the study points to the existence of the intensifying and essentially objective contradiction between the interests of the military-industrial complex and the American nation. The military-industrial complex possesses tremendous power, but as long as the United States remains a democracy, the satisfaction of its interests is possible only on condition that the latter are successfully portrayed as national interests. The citizens can only now be

persuaded of this concurrence with "shock tactics" influencing not so much the thinking as the sphere of emotions and instincts (pp 42-45).

The myth of Soviet military supremacy, T. Gervasi observes, is precisely such "shock tactics". "Assertion of the USSR's strategic superiority has been the biggest lie of the Reagan administration," use of which "has accomplished several tasks simultaneously": "it has helped silence those who criticize the administration's policy" and made it possible to portray the actions of the supporters of a freeze as "dangerous and irresponsible" and "to conceal the glaring contradiction between the administration's declared desire to reduce arms and its avowed intention to build up arms for the sake of achieving advantages for the United States" (pp 45-46).

Responding to the possible question of whether the author was not proceeding from less accurate data than those in the possession of the administration, he emphasized that both he and the administration had essentially identical information, the common source of which were ultimately the data of Western intelligence services. As the book observes repeatedly, they are perfectly reliable since modern intelligence resources, to a description of which a large place is devoted, make it possible "to see each missile, each aircraft, each tank and each warship... wherever they are"--"more than can be seen by human eyes" (pp 251-252). With a monopoly on intelligence reports, the administration turns objective information into disinformation--and the author analyzes the myth-making techniques in detail. U.S. citizens, who have traditionally trusted the government, simply cannot believe that Washington officials deliberately disinform the nation and its allies and endeavor "to deny Americans knowledge of the real state of affairs," virtually subordinating the mass media to their diktat (pp 69, 112).

The work also consistently refutes other components of the "Soviet threat" myth, specifically, the fraudulent propositions concerning the "intractability" of the USSR at negotiations, their concocting and implementation of expansionist plans and use of chemical weapons and fabrications concerning the "violation" of agreements and accords in the arms limitation and control sphere. Studying these attacks, the scholar observes that the administration and the mass media working for it frequently ascribe to the USSR what the United States has already done or intends doing.

T. Gervasi pays particular attention to the Soviet-American arms limitation and reduction talks. The history of these negotiations, he writes, shows that the United States has almost always put forward proposals which are known to be unacceptable to the other side and which are frequently attended by conditions which are insulting, provocative and unrelated to the problems under discussion. "Why does the United States want," we read, "the USSR to reject the American arms control proposals? Because, for the most part, the United States itself does not want the USSR to accept these proposals" (p 255).

The so-called "intractability" of the USSR, the expert notes, is the result of the administration's attempts to impose on it unacceptable conditions, which, in addition, would be obligatory only for the Soviet side and which Washington wishes to interpret as it pleases and as is beneficial to it at the given

specific moment (pp 17-18). The American proposals "invariably provide for greater reductions of Soviet arms, and fewer, American," and simultaneously with this, what is more, the United States is speeding up programs of the development of the most dangerous arms of the next generation in the hope of winning at all costs (p 16). To understand the United States' position at the Soviet-American negotiations it is important to recall, the monograph emphasizes, that the country's leadership is "negotiating not only with the USSR but also with the American people" (p 255) and, systematically deluding its compatriots, endeavoring to obtain from the nation a mandate for a continued arms race profitable only to the military-industrial complex.

Although the book was written prior to the meeting in Reykjavik, many of the author's conclusions have proven, unfortunately, correct and will evidently preserve a certain prognostic value. Having brought together the critical observations expressed about the Reagan administration by representatives of various political forces and having generally substantiated these observations, T. Gervasi has raised the criticism of the administration's military and foreign policy to a higher level. His philosophy is also characterized by certain negative features preventing, in particular, perception of the idea of the safeguarding of international and national security by political means. Thus the author preserves his belief in the possibility of ensuring security predominantly by military-technical means. This belief could serve as the conceptual basis for a continuation of the race in arms (conventional, particularly), which would be no less ruinous and dangerous and could at any moment lead to a resumption of the buildup of nuclear arsenals.

FOOTNOTE

- * T. Gervasi, "The Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy," New York etc., Harper and Row, 1986, pp XI + 545.

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"Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1987

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SOVIET JOURNALIST, BRITISH SCHOLAR DISCUSS DETERRENCE DOCTRINE

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Jun 87 p 5

(Discussion between John Eldridge, professor, University of Glasgow, and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reviewer S. Volovets: "'Samovar' Restraint"; date and place not specified; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Text] A document on the military doctrine of participating Warsaw Pact states was adopted at a Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee for those states. It clearly and concisely expresses the defensive nature of socialism's military concepts. The committee in Berlin also declared that the time had come to repudiate the doctrine of "nuclear deterrence" which has nuclear weapons as a guarantee of security. For several years John Eldridge, a professor at the University of Glasgow (Great Britain), has been studying the doctrine of deterrence and the methods that Western propaganda uses to justify it. He and his colleagues have published several works on this subject that have aroused great interest. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA reviewer S. Volovets discusses this with J. Eldridge.

[Eldridge] In 1947 George Kennan, then a former deputy head of a military college, published an article that coined the term "deterrence" relative to the Soviet Union. Forty years have passed and he, now grown wise through a lot of experience as a diplomat and state figure, is requesting that the doctrine of deterrence, and in any case nuclear deterrence as it has been for a long time, be renounced. There are more and more such authoritative voices among Western scientists, politicians and military experts. How do you explain the public opinion turn-around in many countries toward the search for non-nuclear alternative methods for guaranteeing security?

[Volovets] In my opinion, the main reason is that the concept of deterrence in the 1980's has lost its authenticity and has ceased to be likely in the eyes of many people. Deterrence suggests that each side is always unconditionally ready to take that one step that is senseless and cannot be justified by any moral: to be enticed to not only destroy the enemy and themselves, but the whole world as well. As time has passed, this has become even more technically possible and all the more irrational from any other point of view.

And it has just been in recent years that scientists in the USSR and the U.S. have reliably established the previously unknown consequences of a full-scale nuclear war, one that would be equally fatal for all the inhabitants of this planet. These consequences are "nuclear winter" and the destruction of the ozone layer through explosions in the earth's atmosphere. And I am sure that we will find still more unexpected warnings in this area since what we know about the possible consequences of nuclear war is certainly less than what we do not know. In short, the contradiction between the reason and folly of this doctrinal action's assumptions that are leading to the disappearance of mankind has reached critical mass and its foundations are beginning to cave in before our eyes.

[Eldridge] It is certainly still early to talk about the doctrine's elimination, but the doctrine of deterrence had aroused extremely strong distrust even before the research that you mentioned. Very many people doubted that a man in his right mind could push the button to achieve a specific political goal since this action would lead to the destruction of his enemy, yet would cause the destruction of his own country at the same time. The American scientist Herman Kahn, former director of the Hudson Institute and one of the first who "thought about the unthinkable," even wrote (although he did not recommend that they carry out this idea) about the possibility of creating what he called the "machine of terrible justice." This was a system that had computers deciding to employ nuclear weapons if the opposing side took certain actions that the opponent had stated beforehand were determined to be unacceptable. Then the human factor would be eliminated from the decision-making process, nuclear war would become automatic under certain conditions and deterrence would be reliable. But in this case, it would be impossible to stop a catastrophe in case of technical error, an incorrect interpretation of other actions or all unforeseen factors. Under the well-known American concept the machine called for in "Star Wars" is adopting many of these ideas.

[Volovets] The Strategic Defense Initiative is an American fantasy and yet another example of pre-nuclear thinking, sentimental nostalgia about the times when a nation could guarantee its own security through advance military technology. But if you like, SDI in its perverted form signifies a departure from deterrence. President Reagan is seeking a way to reject nuclear weapons, but in an incorrect manner. Here is a case where intentions can be more important than the false means to accomplish them. It will be possible to deny the means. In any case, the most important thing is to repudiate bombs as a method.

[Eldridge] It is difficult to believe in this because SDI in no way suggests the possibility of subsequent nuclear disarmament, but is simply a reliable anti-nuclear defense which they are carefully hiding from the American people themselves. Lieutenant General G. Abrahamson heads the organization that is carrying out the entire project and he unequivocally declared, "A perfect defense is unrealistic." U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense R. (Delauer) confirmed that he did not see that offensive systems would become unnecessary with the level of protection provided by the space shield. The majority of technical experts in the U.S. feel that approximately 10 percent of the missiles will penetrate at any level of the system's perfection and this is

enough to make America disappear. All of this forces one to see SDI in its true light, as a space makeweight for a first-strike potential.

[Volovets] Be that as it may, I do not totally exclude the possibility of increasing the stability in the world by changing the very structure of weapons, with the condition that nuclear weapons be totally repudiated. Many people in the West are now talking about a new conception of international security which they sometimes unfortunately call "transarming." In my opinion, it contains one very important point -- the armies of all countries would be structurally unprepared to attack. What is the essence of this idea? The armed forces of every country must be organizationally set up in such a way that they can only carry out defensive missions. It would be physically impossible for one country to attack another with these armed forces.. In my opinion, this type of thinking is very promising. It is difficult to argue with the fact that a mine is more a defensive weapon and a tank an offensive weapon.

[Eldridge] Yes, if you are only talking about an anti-tank mine and not one fired from a multi-round launcher. These allow one to establish minefields far ahead of the front lines, in the potential enemy's rear area, and is this defensive? The neutron bomb was also widely advertised as a purely defensive weapon in its time. But it is even more than this. "Transarming" more than anything opens the way to a race in the area of weapons which the Americans call "exotic." These are based on the latest scientific discoveries and have extremely specialized designations, make extensive use of computers and have destructive forces that are comparable to those of weapons of mass destruction. In general they see any attempts to upgrade arms to increase security as having no future when compared to the possibility of radically reducing all weapons. Our idea is to reduce to a level where attack become impossible.

[Volovets] Nonetheless "transarming" is being supported by many military experts who are sincerely for detente between the East and the West. But let us return to deterrence. Distrust in this doctrine certainly appeared a long time ago. But two situations in the mid-80's became catalysts for the rapid elimination of this doctrine, although this process is relatively far from over. First, I do not remember any discussion being more extensive than the one caused by the deployment of American cruise missiles and Pershing-2 missiles into Europe. There was an explosion of self-awareness and the forces of political imagination were unleashed. Second, and more important, by this time there was not much of the myth about a Soviet invasion of Western Europe that remained.

[Eldridge] There is still clear adherence to nuclear weapons, as was confirmed only in the last several weeks by the highest governmental representatives of Western countries. And just the same, we cannot count on the myth that you are talking about dying a natural death. As your countryman, poet and humorist Roger (Waddis), said in parodying the thinking of such people, "Regardless of how they disarm, the Russians still have more samovars."

[Volovets] This is a metaphysical arms race, the inertia of political thinking. We began the discussion with an article by G. Kennan. This same author wrote that preparing for armed war with Russia is so ingrained in the ideology and customs of many millions of Americans that it will take many years to overcome it, even if you imagined that during that time the Soviet Union will mysteriously disappear from this planet.

But I hope that people in your country, a country that is now undergoing very intense and rapid changes, are able to also notice the changes that are taking place in our society. These changes are really there and are very apparent in comparison to the situation that existed in the early 1980's. In summation, I repeat that the essence of the matter is that the "Soviet threat" and the doctrine of deterrence are still alive in the West, but I am convinced that they are very frail, that they belong to the past and must yield to to political and military doctrines that are compatible with reason and the requirements of our times.

12511

CSO: 5200/1536

SOVIET JOURNAL PROPOSES MEDITERRANEAN PEACE ZONE

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 6, Jun 87 pp 90-95

[Article by Veniamin Mashin]

[Text]

The Mediterranean, the cradle of many civilisations, has since time immemorial served as the shortest and most convenient route for trade and cooperation. Today the Mediterranean is the main route from Western Europe and the USA to the Middle East, the capitalist world's biggest oil source accounting for over 50 per cent of the world deposits of black gold. This is why the Mediterranean attracts the imperialist powers like a magnet. The area has been the scene of repeated fierce clashes and conflicts brought about by the colonialist policies of the Western countries, their expansionist designs on the Mediterranean countries, the desire to dominate the area and subjugate the littoral states.

In recent years the situation in the region has reached a dangerous level of tension as a result of growing militarisation, notably US military presence, the militaristic buildup of Washington's NATO allies, and the use or threat of military force against sovereign Mediterranean states. "The reasons for this are well known," reads a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard Shevardnadze to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, "they stem from the US 'neoglobalism' policy, from its imperial aspirations aimed at destabilising the governments that do not suit it and suppressing national liberation movements."¹ In the Pentagon and NATO plans, the Mediterranean is featured as "the South European theatre of operations". It is seen as one of the most convenient springboards for possible aggression against the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries, for confrontation with the forces of social progress.

In this context, ensuring peace and security in the Mediterranean is an increasingly important challenge whose significance goes beyond this geographical region. It is not by chance that several recent sessions of the UN General Assembly have noted in their resolutions on the Mediterranean that security in the region is closely linked with international peace and security. Resolution 41/89 of the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly, drafted by the delegations of Malta, Libya, Algeria, Yugoslavia, and other non-aligned Mediterranean countries, as well as Romania, urged for further efforts to create conditions for security and cooperation in the Mediterranean. It stressed the need to resolve the existing crises in the region on the basis of the UN Charter, to withdraw foreign occupation forces and respect the right of the peoples under colonial or foreign domination to self-determination and independence.

¹ *Izvestia*, July 9, 1986.

For many years and even decades the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean has been aggravated by the Arab-Israeli conflict which has erupted into major armed clashes more than once. The Eastern Mediterranean continues to be a dangerous seat of tensions threatening the security of the region and international peace because the USA supports and encourages Israel's aggressive expansionist claims and uses Tel Aviv's military machine to struggle against the Arab national liberation movement, and keep "recalcitrant Arabs" at bay.

Since the 1950s relations between Greece and Turkey have been seriously aggravated by the Cyprus problem and the problem of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. New evidence of this is the recent aggravation of tensions between Turkey and Greece last March. The Cyprus problem erupted into a sharp regional crisis in July 1974, when Turkish troops occupied the northern part of that island republic. The situation in and around Cyprus remains extremely tense through the fault of the imperialist forces.

Among the conflict situations that prevent the Mediterranean region from becoming a zone of peace and cooperation are the Anglo-Spanish rivalry over Gibraltar, the last colonial enclave in Europe, and differences between Spain and Morocco over the two Spanish enclaves on Moroccan territory. The question of the Western Sahara is also usually included among the major Mediterranean problems. To this day the Western Sahara people have been denied the right to self-determination, recognised by the UN and the OAU.

In the 1970s, the process of international détente exerted a positive influence on the general political atmosphere in the Mediterranean as well. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe stressed that European security was intimately linked with the security in the Mediterranean as a whole and that the process of strengthening security must cover the Mediterranean. It stressed that "the strengthening of security and the intensification of cooperation in Europe would stimulate positive processes in the Mediterranean region".²

The strengthening of security and improvement of the political climate in Europe created conditions for broader peaceful cooperation between the Mediterranean countries on the basis of good neighbourliness and mutual benefit. Simultaneously it brought clearer awareness of the fact that to create an atmosphere of confidence and stability it is necessary to end the arms race in the region, reduce military potentials, eliminate foreign military bases and remove nuclear weapons. Needless to say, détente did not and could not mean that the local Mediterranean conflicts would be automatically resolved. At the same time, by defusing the conflicts in Europe in general it put on a different plane such problems as the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, etc.

The political barometer in the Mediterranean began to move from "fair" to "stormy" in the late 1970 and early 1980s, when the most aggressive imperialist quarters, notably in the USA, committed themselves to an aggravation of international tensions, building up the arms race, undermining détente, and gaining military superiority over the USSR and the socialist community as a whole. Viewing the Mediterranean as an important springboard for its global hegemonistic aspirations, the US administration launched a massive buildup of its military presence in the area and started to increasingly penetrate the Northern as well as the Southern Mediterranean. War tensions and national liberation movements aggravated local and regional conflicts in the Mediterranean, which in turn seriously aggravate the situation in Europe and in the world as a whole.

² Вильям Уоррен, *Восстановление и укрепление мира в Европе. Соглашения по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе, конференция в Амстердаме 1975 года*, Издательство 1975 г. с. 64.

The American military presence in the region situated thousands of kilometres from US shores destabilises the situation in the Mediterranean, while Washington's military blackmail of the sovereign littoral states undermines the security of the countries in the region which already has more than its share of conflict situations fraught with dire consequences for universal peace.

Shortly after the Second World War, in a bid to impose a Pax Americana on the Mediterranean countries the US set about to entangle the countries of the region in a network of military bases and installations under the aegis of NATO and on the basis of bilateral agreements. According to the foreign press, the Pentagon now has 11 naval and air bases, three major intelligence centres, two land bases, four missile bases, major depots of nuclear weapons and military hardware, military ship tracking facilities. These installations provide the basis for Washington's interference in the affairs of the littoral states, for US use of force to blackmail Arab and other independent countries in the Mediterranean.

The US Sixth Fleet, comprising dozens of warships, including aircraft carriers, is a weapon of imperialist aggression and plunder, threatening the independence of Mediterranean states and impeding normal transport communications. This is evidenced by repeated interference of the American armada in the Middle East crisis, the flexing of military muscle off the coast of several Arab states and the wide scope of US and NATO naval exercises in the Mediterranean.

Since 1982 troops of the USA and other NATO countries have been deployed on the Sinai Peninsula to supervise observance of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. In 1982-1984 the USA jointly with Italy, France and Britain landed a so-called multinational force of more than 5,000 servicemen in Beirut, under the pretext of promoting security and stability in Lebanon. In fact, these troops have been interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign Arab country and have used force against the Lebanese, Palestinians and Syrians. Washington did not only encourage Israeli aggression against Lebanon, but became a virtual accomplice in it. The *New Jersey* battleship used its heavy artillery to shell peaceful Lebanese towns and villages, and US Air Force planes raided Lebanese territory. Thus the United States virtually joined the Israelis in hostilities against the Arabs.

According to the foreign press, the Pentagon intends to send to some of its Mediterranean bases Rapid Deployment Force trained in order to destroy military installations and establish bridgeheads. These dangerous plans can not be ignored especially in view of the known intention of the militaristic US and NATO circles to extend the area covered by the North Atlantic bloc.

The American-Israeli "strategic alliance" formed in the early 1980s, manifested itself in joint acts of aggression against Lebanon. The tragedy of that country's people who became victims of the Israeli aggression, in fact of joint US-Israeli armed actions, along with American threats and blackmail followed by US interventionist actions in order to make another Arab state—Libya—abandon its independent foreign policy—all confirm that the main cause of greater tensions in this vast region is the quantitative and qualitative upgrading of the US military presence in the Mediterranean and the involvement of some NATO allies in Washington's brandishing of military power.

It is significant that in the 1970s-1980s aid to Mediterranean countries accounted for more than half of the total US aid to foreign countries. This fact alone is convincing evidence of the importance the US rulers attach to that region. Another sign of the active expansion and modernisation of the American NATO system of bases is that the early 1980s saw

the signing or renewal of agreements on US military presence and the use of military facilities with Spain, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Portugal and Morocco.

Military spending in the Mediterranean countries, members of NATO, as in all NATO countries, is growing from year to year. According to SIPRI, in the past ten years the military budgets of the Mediterranean NATO states have increased by one-third.³ Moreover, the Pentagon and NATO strategists have seemed inclined to consider the Mediterranean as the central front of the Western alliance, with its potential southern front to stretch from the Horn of Africa to the Persian Gulf. This is the conclusion following from the 1983 interim report of the NATO sub-committee on the southern region.

As a result of the actions by Washington and some of its NATO allies the nuclear danger is looming over the Mediterranean. This danger stems especially from the American cruise missile base in Comiso on the Italian island of Sicily, where 112 launchers are installed. These first-strike nuclear weapons threaten not only socialist countries. Their range (2,500 kilometres) enables them to reach deep into Africa and the Middle East, to strike targets in the littoral Mediterranean countries, and in more remote ones, such as Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, etc.

American nuclear weapon-carrying ships have been in the Mediterranean for a long time and most recently it became known that several US bases in the region also have nuclear weapons. According to *The Washington Post* the minutes of Congress hearing included a list of air bases where US Air Force nuclear capable aircraft are in a state of combat readiness. These include five bases in Turkey, three in Italy, and one in Greece. Nuclear weapons carrying fighter-bombers there are in a state of constant combat alert, ready to take off at 15 minutes' notice.⁴ Last summer the foreign press published reports on the Pentagon's plan to create nuclear weapons storing facilities on the territories of Washington's allies, including Turkey, Italy and Greece.

History has seen many attempts to dominate the Mediterranean. These attempts have invariably ended in failure and did nothing to boost the popularity of those who launched them. To seek this goal today means to live in a world of illusion, to disregard reality. The brazen US attack on Libya caused a sharp international crisis demonstrating the dangers of the current situation in the Mediterranean. The American weekly *Newsweek* wrote that the US air raid on Libya was seen in Europe "as the greatest crisis in transatlantic relations since World War II—or at least since the Suez war 30 years ago".⁵ This US use of force was a particularly egregious form of Washington's neglect of its allies' interests causing concern among its NATO partners.

The European Parliament in its resolution of April 16, 1986 voted overwhelmingly to condemn the US air raid of Libya as a gross violation of international law. The US act against Libya was perceived as a threat and warning to all the countries in the region, stressed the *Istanbul Milli Gazete*. Its aim is to show that anyone who dares to challenge the United States would meet with Libya's lot.

The crisis in Southern Mediterranean has escalated tensions in the region and affected the dialogue between East and West. The US interventionist actions against Mediterranean countries had a negative impact on international relations and did not improve Washington's image abroad. And yet the US administration has not given up sabre rattling and continues to build up its huge arsenal in the Mediterranean.

³ *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1985*, London, pp. 272-273.

⁴ *The Washington Post*, July 9, 1986.

⁵ *Newsweek*, May 26, 1986, p. 4.

By contrast, the Soviet Union's approach to the Mediterranean problems is constructive. Security in the region is a vital concern for the Soviet Union because it is in the immediate proximity of its southern borders and it is the only route linking southern Soviet ports with Soviet ports in other seas and with the World Ocean. Firmly committed to turning the Mediterranean into a sea of peace and friendly cooperation, the USSR, a Black Sea and therefore a Mediterranean power, would like the peoples of all the countries in the region to enjoy the full and equal benefits of peace and cooperation.

The Soviet policy is in keeping with the Leninist policy of peace, detente and of ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war. Here, as in other parts of the world, the USSR does not seek any one-sided advantages or benefits at the expense of other countries. The Soviet approach to providing peace and security in the Mediterranean is manifested in concrete deeds aimed at achieving real political results, eliminating the military threat, notably the danger of nuclear conflict, turning this region into a zone of peace and good neighbourly cooperation.

Seeking to ensure tranquility and genuine stability in the region, the Soviet Union in the early 1980s made proposals to strengthen security in the Mediterranean envisaging international agreements of the following issues:

- the spread of confidence building measures in the military sphere, which have already proved their validity in international practice, to the Mediterranean region;

- agreed reduction of armed forces in the region;

- removal of nuclear weapons carrying ships from the Mediterranean;

- non deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non nuclear Mediterranean countries;

- an undertaking by the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country that does not allow such weapons on its territory.

Adhering to its line for eliminating conflict situations in the Mediterranean by political means and for preventing international crises, the Soviet Union made new concrete proposals on a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement in the Middle East on July 29, 1984, and a proposal on the principles of Cyprus settlement and ways to achieve it on January 22, 1986.

The Soviet Union vigorously supports measures to strengthen stability in the region taken as part of the CSCE process. The numerous Soviet initiatives aimed at spreading international detente to the Mediterranean accord with the spirit and letter of the Final Act. The Soviet Union is doing much to foster fruitful links and equal cooperation with the Mediterranean countries that were not participants in the CSCE. It favours broader contacts and dialogue with all the countries in the region, seeks to contribute to the preservation of peace, reduction of armed forces, the strengthening of security and lessening tensions in the Mediterranean.

Proceeding from the decisions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU and from the understanding that in the present world situation concrete actions are needed so that the states start jointly moving towards a reliable system of international peace and security covering all the regions of the world, and including the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union in the spring of 1986 launched a far reaching initiative to improve the situation in the region. On March 26, at the Kremlin dinner in honour of President Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria, Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a withdrawal of Soviet and US navies from the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union is forced to keep its ships there because the US Sixth Fleet, armed with nuclear weapons and threatening the security of the USSR and its allies and friends,

is present in the Mediterranean close to the Soviet borders. The Soviet Union favours the creation of a chemical weapons-free zone in the Mediterranean.

The implementation of the constructive Soviet proposals, the elimination in Europe of the Soviet and the US medium range missiles, the restriction of naval activities and the reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe would undoubtedly improve the situation in the Mediterranean and in the world. Convinced that the problem of security in the region should be resolved by the joint efforts of all the Mediterranean states the USSR regards with understanding the peaceful initiatives of the non aligned Mediterranean countries.

A broad conference similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would be useful, in the Soviet view. In addition to the Mediterranean states and states neighbouring on the region, the USA and other interested countries could take part in the conference. The states at this forum could agree on certain recommendations to create a regime of peace and security for the Mediterranean region. Judging by the numerous favourable comments, the public in Europe and the Mediterranean approves of this Soviet initiative.

More and more voices are heard in the Mediterranean countries urging that the Vienna CSCE follow up meeting address the problems of detente and of bringing down military activities in the region. There is growing support for a chemical weapons free zone in the Mediterranean.

The Soviet Union takes a positive stand on the considerations of all other states on practical ways to normalise the situation in the Mediterranean, including the Valletta declaration adopted by the conference of foreign ministers of non-aligned countries and the Palestine Liberation Organisation in September 1981 and the proposal on limiting military activity in the Mediterranean advanced by Malta at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in November 1981.

Despite the stubborn opposition by the Washington administration to efforts at strengthening peace and stability in the Mediterranean the United States and its closest NATO allies will hardly be able to avoid the discussion of security in the region in the context of European security. From the Soviet point of view, the United Nations must use its authority and possibilities to help turn the Mediterranean into a region of lasting peace, security and cooperation for all.

The socialist countries participants in the Warsaw Treaty spoke in favour of lessening tensions in the Mediterranean, turning it into a region of stable peace and good neighbourly cooperation and of a corresponding international conference to this end. They reaffirmed their position on this issue at the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers' Committee in Bucharest on October 11-15, 1986.

To be sure, bringing about the much desired peace, tranquility and security to the Mediterranean peoples is no simple task. However, this urgent international problem can and must be solved. This is the aim of the full scale set of proposals and initiatives proposed by the Soviet Union, initiatives aimed at turning the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and good neighbourly cooperation.

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SOVIET PRESS PUBLISHES ARTICLES ON 'SUFFICIENT DEFENSE'

IZVESTIYA Views Concept

PH141227 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Doctor of Historical Sciences L. Semeyko article: "Instead of Mountains of Arms... On the Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency"; words within slantlines published in boldface; final paragraph is IZVESTIYA note]

[Text] The question of what a state's military power must represent in terms of size, nature, and function is one of the main questions separating the new and old political thinking in the security sphere. The old thinking proceeds in principle from the idea of "the more, the better," the idea that gaining military supremacy over an opponent can almost automatically guarantee a victorious outcome in a potential war.

The new thinking denies this confrontationist approach. It favors a minimum and not a maximum of military might for both sides and favors excluding the idea of seeking a military solution to disputed international problems. This quest is senseless, for with the continuation of the arms race war will increasingly appear to equate with universal destruction.

It will become even more senseless if all states are oriented to exclusively defensive military doctrines -- not only in declarations, but also in actions.

We can pride ourselves on the fact that it is our country that has proclaimed the new political thinking, transforming it from the good intentions of perspicacious scientists and public figures into the directives of a practical policy. The 27th CPSU Congress clearly formulated these directives. The subsequent actions by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies concretized them both conceptually and, if you like, materially. This is illustrated by our repeated unilateral measures to contain the arms race, our constructive proposals for the creation of an all-embracing system of international security, and the terms of the recently announced Warsaw Pact military doctrine.

Among the most important political directives of the new thinking, special significance attaches to the principle of reasonable sufficiency. It is this concept that is the basis for the construction of the USSR and Warsaw Pact Armed Forces. It makes a large contribution to shaping the socialist countries' approach to reducing military potential and demonstrates the truly defensive thrust of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact and the national doctrines of its member states. Where does the essence of the concept lie?

The /political/ aspect lies in its emphasis on the strictly defensive function of armed forces and their readiness for defense against outside attack and not for attack and aggression: The concept is characterized by the priority given to the political solution of international disputes and the stress on continually reducing the level of military confrontation and on supporting and strengthening strategic stability through strictly monitored arms limitation and reduction of arms to reasonable limits ensuring the interests of reliable defense. The desire for a peaceful and purely peaceful solution of international disputes must be confirmed by the defensive, nonthreatening nature of the entire series of indicators of military potentials' might. The existing disproportion between political directives to strengthen peace and security (there are more than enough of the appropriate declarations today) and the menacing size and nature of military might must be eliminated, irrespective of whether these threats are real or invented.

Indisputably, the creation and maintenance of a particular military might is determined, above all, by interests of security, that is by political aims. However, in any case the size and nature of military might must be reasonable; they must conform to the realities of the nuclear age and have an exclusively defensive thrust.

I am talking about the military-political concept of the socialist community countries and it is not hard to imagine the significance its adoption by the whole international community and, above, all, its adoption by the NATO states would have. This would ensure most completely both mutual (USSR-United States) and universal security and would create an atmosphere of genuine trust in one another.

The concept of reasonable sufficiency is oriented to the future and carries a charge of ideas for long-term action. It may be fully implemented in a nuclear-free world -- with the elimination of nuclear weapons and other types of mass destruction weapons. But, it is necessary to ensure right now the permanent increasingly large-scale reduction of weapons arsenals to the minimum reasonable limits.

The concept's /military/ aspect lies in the fact that specific indicators of military potential must actually confirm the defensive (nonoffensive, nonaggressive) nature of the military doctrines and at the same time ensure reliable security.

What does this mean? Here I think one can discern at least two important criteria.

The first is that the military might of a state or a coalition of states must assure that no one has grounds for fears, even imaginary fears, for their security. This criterion demands reasonable sufficiency exclusively for defense purposes and not an unreasonable surplus of military potential, where a military threat can always be perceived. Here the mere proclamation of one's military doctrine's defensive thrust, as is characteristic of NATO, in particular is not enough. Confirmations of this are needed in terms of the size of the armed forces and their distribution and structure, the nature of their armaments, military activity undertaken and, of course, in terms of constructive actions to reduce the level of military strategic equilibrium. Without this, declarations will remain declarations and mutual suspicions will not only be a permanent feature but will also be capable of causing the swift emergence of crisis situations.

The sufficiency of military potentials is expressed both in terms of the precise quantity and quality of armaments and the troops themselves intended for defense, and also in terms of their structure and stationing. These and other factors must convincingly show the absence of aggressive intentions. In this context the Warsaw

Pact countries' doctrinal purpose is of fundamental significance: To implement the reduction in Europe of armed forces and conventional armaments to a level whereby neither of the sides, while ensuring its defense, has the means to suddenly attack the other side or to unleash offensive operations in general. This purpose is indeed revolutionary because it proposes for the first time that both sides mutually reject such a military action such as attack, which is traditionally considered to be fundamental. The proposals for the mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive types of armaments from the zone in which the two sides are directly contiguous and for a reduction in the concentration of armed forces and armaments in this zone to a minimum agreed level are also innovative. This approach is mutually beneficial and once again confirms the need for international recognition and adoption of the principle of reasonable sufficiency.

The second criterion is that military might and combat readiness must be sufficient to permit them not to be taken unawares (let us recall the sad experience of 1941) and, if a hostile attack occurs, to deal the aggressor a crushing rebuff. While the first criterion is aimed at ensuring that the other side has no unwarranted fears, the point of the second is that we and our allies equally want to be spared the sense of an imminent threat looming over us.

Sufficiency does not preclude but, on the contrary, presupposes the presence of strategic parity -- that decisive factor in preventing war. It is necessary to have within the framework of parity a reasonably sufficient military potential capable of reliably ensuring the security of the USSR and its allies. This means that under contemporary conditions we are obliged to have a guaranteed potential for nuclear retaliation designed to prevent an unpunished nuclear attack under any, even the most unfavorable, nuclear attack scenarios. In any situation, an answering strike must unacceptably damage the aggressor. The inevitability of this must discourage him from attack. In turn, sufficiency with regard to conventional weapons means the capability to reliably ensure the collective defense of the socialist community countries.

We want to be spared the sense of an imminent threat, both as a result of the Warsaw Pact's military potential being a sufficiently reliable shield to defend us and by virtue of the NATO bloc actually demonstrating its renunciation of aggression, of the gamble on military supremacy, and of the maintenance and especially the buildup of menacingly large armed forces.

But at the moment, there is no proof that the North Atlantic bloc has embarked on this, the only correct path. Since so much of our security depends on the resolutions and actions of the United States and its allies, our Armed Forces, limits of sufficiency cannot be permanent. We cannot fail to take into consideration the fact that the U.S. Armed Forces' construction is now based not on the concept of reasonable sufficiency but on the concept of military supremacy. We cannot fail to be alarmed at the contradictions in the policy and statements (and this is also policy) of U.S. leaders. Here is an example from President Reagan's speeches. The first (and commendable) statement: "There can be no greater happiness than reaching an agreement that will rid the earth of nuclear weapons for all time," and the second statement (which really chills the soul): "May our adversary go to sleep each night in fear waiting for us to use nuclear weapons." Under these conditions we need special precision in assessing our own capabilities, self-possession, and supreme responsibility in making decisions. But in any case the limits of our Armed Forces' sufficiency must be reasonable and not exceed actual defensive requirements. We do not support the idea of eternal nuclear deterrence just as we resolutely oppose hypocritical, totally unrealistic plans to ensure the creation of a nuclear-free world with the help of SDI. Lasting security can

only be guaranteed on the path of consistent disarmament and by reducing military potentials to a reasonable nuclear-free minimum, ensuring the interests of defense. That is precisely how the 27th CPSU Congress put the question.

The /economic/ aspect of the concept under review is obvious. Its implementation means saving the huge means and resources which every state and all mankind need so badly to resolve constructive tasks. The experience of history convincingly confirms that the law of diminishing returns operates in raising the level of military confrontation: increasingly reduced efficiency of arms increments and increasingly large expenditure on them. The situation is obviously absurd. Furthermore the desire for a surplus of military might has inevitably always led to the slowing down of socioeconomic and technological processes. For 400 years the Roman Empire directed its technological achievements above all to military requirements. The result was stagnation in all spheres. The Pentagon is also a kind of huge black hole sucking up the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution and providing practically nothing in exchange. In the opinion of leading U.S. economists, over the past 30 years the military has been responsible for one-half of the instances of U.S. economic backwardness with regard to particular targets. We do not want this practice either for the U.S. or for ourselves, or for anyone else.

The mutual orientation of the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, toward reasonable sufficiency of military might would ensure not only accelerated transition from nuclear confrontation to a nuclear-free world and, consequently, the consolidation of mutual and universal security, but also broad scope for resolving the global tasks facing mankind. This is the tremendous importance for all mankind of the military-political concept proclaimed by the Soviet Union and now enshrined in the Warsaw Pact military doctrine.

The author of the article is a leading researcher at the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute. He has written a whole series of works on military-political problems.

PRAVDA Cites PRC Weekly

PH241445 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Aug 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Article in Chinese Newspaper"]

[Text] Beijing, 18 Aug -- "The Soviet leadership is applying its efforts to a sober analysis of the situation and is objectively assessing the USSR's strengths and the peculiarities of the current international situation." The Shanghai weekly SHIJIE JINGJI DAOBAO published an article with this preamble in which an attempt is made to analyze the changes and basic directions of current Soviet foreign policy.

In the process of switching from the "zero option" in Europe to the "global double zero," the author of the article writes, there has been a succession of eye-catching changes in the Soviet Union's foreign policy. These changes are by no means accidental or isolated phenomena; they are the inevitable result of the Soviet Union's reappraisal of its foreign policy strategic thinking.

First, the view of the situation born of the nuclear epoch has changed. Now the Soviet Union believes that there can be no winners or losers in a nuclear war. War means total destruction. Not a single social system will be able to survive a nuclear war. No country can prove the advantage of its structure with the aid of nuclear weapons or a nuclear war.

In the past the Soviet Union believed that because of the relative weakness of its Armed Forces, and particularly its nuclear forces, when compared with the corresponding U.S. forces, it was essential to develop to the utmost the means for a nuclear strike and nuclear retaliation in order to reduce as much as possible the gap between it and the United States. Now the Soviet Union believes that the USSR and the United States possess such a large number of nuclear weapons that they would be able to destroy each other several times over. Thus, a further increase and improvement in nuclear weapons is absurd. In this connection the USSR has put forward a new military principle -- the principle of "sufficient defense." Its basic content lies in choosing the lowest level of armament needed to ensure the Soviet Union's security and destroy an invading aggressor. This principle gives the Soviet Union a theoretical basis to head the struggle against an unrestrained arms race.

The USSR now believes that militarism is not the inevitable result of the development of all capitalist states. Hence, by no means do all capitalist countries pose a military threat to the Soviet Union, nor is their policy always deliberately anti-Soviet. In many areas their policy deserves to be studied. Opportunities for cooperation between the capitalist countries and the Soviet Union have not decreased but increased.

The USSR is now building relations with the socialist countries on the premise that every country has particular conditions and particular interests. Each socialist country has an absolute right to determine independently the methods for building its society, and no outsider has the right to intervene. Not a single communist party nor a single country has a monopoly right to the truth.

As for relations with the developing states, the Soviet Union considers the key link in this question to be that of whether the socialist countries, with the help of their economic might and level of democratic development, can be a convincing example for them.

Thus, the author of the SHIJIE JINGJI DAORAO article concludes, the change in opinions on these aspects of foreign policy confirm that the Soviet leadership is soberly and objectively assessing the USSR's might and the peculiarities of the current international situation. The leadership is applying its efforts to analyzing the world situation from a new standpoint. It is relying here on the available experience, knowledge, and ideological preparation. The USSR believes that, in conducting extensive and profound political and economic reforms within the country, it is essential to coordinate these with a new foreign policy also.

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USSR: UN CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT, DEVELOPMENT CONVENES

Gerasimov Links Disarmament, Development

LD211329 Moscow Service in Russian 1030 GMT 21 Aug 87

[Text] [Announcer] How can developing countries be helped to rid themselves of poverty and backwardness? The Soviet Union and many other states are convinced that disarmament is the only realistic option for implementing effective aid. There will be discussion about all of this at a conference which will soon be opening in New York. Gerasimov, chief of a directorate at the USSR Foreign Ministry, discusses this:

[Begin Gerasimov recording] An international conference opens in New York on 24 August on the correlation between disarmament and development, a large international forum with the participation of practically all states. The only country which has declined to participate in the conference is the United States which, according to its statement, does not see a functional connection between disarmament and development. We, however, do see one. We are firmly convinced that an organic tie exists between disarmament and development.

Only disarmament can liberate enormous additional resources for solving the global problems confronting mankind and for struggling against backwardness and poverty.

The Soviet Union is ready to give a part of the resources to developing countries which are released as a result of [vysvobozhdayushchikhsa ot] real disarmament.

At this conference in New York the Soviet delegation will set out our ideas on disarmament and development and our thinking on the principles and the mechanism of assistance to developing countries as a result of disarmament.

A number of new elements will be put forward in the development of our position as well. [end recording]

Perez de Cuellar Opens Conference

LD242114 Moscow TASS in English 2028 GMT 24 Aug 87

[Text] New York August 25 TASS -- Disarmament is essential to both the developing and developed countries, stated U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar when he

declared open the first international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development on Monday.

He pointed out a particular importance of such conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. talks on medium-range missiles as soon as possible. [sentence as received]

Petrovskiy Addresses Conference

LD252050 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1850 GMT 25 Aug 87

[Text] New York, 25 August (TASS) -- Vladimir Petrovskiy, head of the Soviet delegation and the USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, today addressed the international conference under way here on the relationship between disarmament and development. He read a message from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the conference participants.

In our interdependent world, the head of the Soviet delegation said, where mankind's survival has become a paramount task, the issue of a relationship between disarmament and development stands at a critical point, beyond which a further escalation of the arms buildup threatens not only to put the brakes on progress, but also to nullify all past achievements and the future of civilization. Historical experience and the realities of the nuclear and space age urgently dictate that choices be made in favor of disarmament, development, and a nuclear- and violence-free world.

We have made such choices.

We do not claim to possess any absolute truth, but we would like to share the following thought today.

First, it is today impossible to ensure social and economic stability or a durable peace without a steady rate of development. Development problems and questions of international security are bound together in a single knot. To untie this knot, we must urgently and indeed begin to switch resources toward development.

Obviously, the funds must be released realistically, as a result of limiting and reducing nuclear and other types of armaments. We believe that, when discussing specific disarmament measures, participants in the talks should take into account the expected saving of funds and resources in their own countries, and consider how they will use these savings.

The Soviet Union reaffirms its readiness to give to developing countries some of the funds that it will realistically save from particular measures to curtail the arms race.

The working out of principles for donating funds for development purposes is a question to be solved collectively, and the USSR is ready to participate in this.

The Soviet Union supports the just demands of the developing countries, which advocate resolving their foreign debt problems on the basis of equality, and with recognition of the common responsibility of debtors and creditors. We favor settling this problem politically. A deep reorganization of international economic relations and a halt to the arms race, with the resulting resources freed being used to aid the developing countries, could be such a solution.

An international "disarmament and development" fund open to all states, could, in our view, become the mechanism for transferring resources to the developing countries. Part of the resources saved by states as a result of disarmament measures and of a reduction in military spending would be transferred to this fund. Such a fund could be set up within the UN framework on the basis of an international agreement regulating its activities and the formation and distribution of its resources.

The Soviet Union has proposed this. It is prepared to join such a fund, and to take part in the appropriate tasks with the participation of developed and developing states.

Second, the problem of cutting back military budgets demands a comprehensive approach. It cannot be divided into parts: political, economic, or technical. It is also a problem of mutual trust.

It is common knowledge that attempts to compare military budgets have not yet yielded any positive results because of crucial discrepancies in the structure of arms prices and in price setting mechanisms. The defense budget, which we are publishing, (20.2 billion roubles) for example reflects what the USSR Ministry of Defense spends on personnel of the Armed Forces, logistics [materialno-tekhnicheskoye obespecheniye], military construction, pension funds, and a number of other expenditures. Scientific research, design and testing work, and armament and military technology purchases are accounted for in other articles of the USSR state budget.

When the radical price-setting reform we have mapped out is fully implemented, it will be possible to realistically compare overall military spending.

The socialist countries propose to end military budgets' spiral, to immediately limit this to a reasonably sufficient level. Seeking a shift to practical steps in this area, the Warsaw Treaty participants this April offered to the NATO member states a 1-2 year moratorium on increasing military spending increases for both organizations on a reciprocal basis.

Third, it would even now be possible to embark upon the development of a new economic model for the world under the conditions of disarmament, including planning for the transfer of funds [konversiya] in the developed countries.

The process of this transfer, of course, will not be free of difficulties. It cannot be ruled out that at the initial stages of the disarmament process certain additional expenses will be required. But these difficulties are not comparable with the gigantic dangers entailed by the arms race. And, indeed, the amount of saving of funds in line with the strengthening of the disarmament process will, of course, increase.

The role of the transfer is not limited to the economic aspect of the matter. It is also a mechanism for the complete abolition of the negative social and economic consequences of the arms race, and a way of practically ensuring the link between disarmament and development.

We favor the conduct of research into the transfer, both national and international, state and private research. The idea of conducting international export research into the problem of funds transfer in all its aspects seems fruitful.

Fourth, peaceful alternatives -- a kind of fusion of trust, cooperation, and disarmament -- must be set against military and political confrontation accompanied by an unbridled arms race. Instead of competition in building up nuclear arsenals, we

propose cooperation in the peaceful and safe use of the atom; instead of "Star Wars" -- interaction in a peaceful space and the creation of a world space organization; instead of the production of chemical weapons -- joint forces in the development of a peaceful chemical industry; instead of barriers of secrecy -- an exchange of the top results of peaceful scientific research.

The boundless creative prospects that are opened by the peaceful use of science and technology are illustrated by the "World Laboratory of Scientists", which was created on Italy's initiative, a section of which was opened in Moscow this February.

Cooperation that is open and accessible to everyone would be an important factor for establishing openness [otkrytost] and mutual understanding, and would become a bridge for strengthening international trust and help to speed up the processes of development.

Fifth, we believe that substantial reserves lie in releasing the developing countries from the burden of military spending. The Soviet Union comes out in favor of beginning talks on a bilateral and multilateral basis on the question of limiting the sale and supply of conventional armaments. We are prepared to respond in a positive manner on the basis of reciprocity with the United States to the regional initiatives in this direction, on the understanding, of course, that their results take into account the lawful interests of all states of the corresponding regions.

Sixth, the international networks, and primarily the United Nations, will have to play a central role in carrying out the strategy of 'disarmament for development'.

We consider that the conference must become an important landmark in the United Nations' activity on the difficult but humane road to the interrelation of these two processes.

We regret that the consensus that existed in recent years on the convening of the conference did not find logical expression in the participation of all UN members, even more so of one of the largest members, in this forum. We consider the U.S. refusal to participate in the conference to be primarily the expression of a certain political standpoint. In boycotting the collective search for ways of resolving this global task, is this not a striking example of outdated, selfish thinking and of a profound gap between word and deed?

Nonetheless, we believe that the states that have gathered at this conference will be able to accomplish worthwhile work and to make the conference the beginning of a new approach to the problems of disarmament and development!

The USSR proposal that the conference's recommendations and the entire complex of disarmament and development problems become the subject of a special summit meeting of the Security Council member states reflects that approach. Such a meeting would help weave the "disarmament for development" idea in the fabric of international relations and make these relations a milestone for practical activity.

We have supported all proposals directed at setting up an organizational framework for the process from disarmament to development. For our part, we suggest holding regular review conferences on this issue.

The IAEA, specialized establishments, and UN bodies can and should play an increasing role in the united "disarmament and development," strategy, naturally, within their scope.

When it is expedient, we deem it necessary to create new international mechanisms and institutions. Their potential contribution to international cooperation, disarmament, and development should become the measure of their worth.

The Soviet Union's and other socialist countries' considerations on disarmament and development issues and their specific proposals in that area are rendered in fuller detail in the socialist countries' collective memorandum, which will be presented tomorrow by the CSSR delegation.

These considerations are a specific application of the new political thinking to the correlation between disarmament and development. The new thinking, while acknowledging the supremacy of universal human values and the priority of human survival tasks, proceeds from the need to turn from words to deeds, to immediate joint efforts to organize international life on a qualitatively new basis without relying on weapons and violence.

The new political philosophy focuses on things in common, which bring states together and make it possible for them to bring their approaches closer together. It envisages unbiased, objective, and conscientious attitudes to each other's considerations. There is no place today for debaters, mutual recriminations, or fruitless arguments. Something else is needed: the joint realization of realities, no matter how severe and indigestible they are, a constructive and fruitful dialogue with a practical return. It is only through joint efforts that states can resolve the problems that have spread beyond national frameworks, that have become universal.

That is the way in which we formulate the question in the context of new political thinking. Disarmament is, of course, not an end in itself. We are firmly in favor of every measure for limiting and reducing armaments, every step along the road to freeing nations from nuclear and other weapons, not only bringing them more security, but also making it possible to allocate more funds to improve people's living conditions.

In the same way, we envisage the principle "disarmament for development" to solve the disastrous situation in the developing countries, which has acquired a global dimension. Unequal exchange rates, unfair trade, the machinations and arbitrary actions over bank rates, and pumping out of money by multinational corporations further heighten the poverty of some countries and the wealth of others. Without doubt a causal link exists between the developing countries' 300 million debt [currency not specified] and the more than 300 million [currency not specified] increase in U.S. military spending over the last decade. The connection between some \$2 billion that are annually pumped out of the developing states and the almost \$3 billion U.S. military budget is not accidental.

In this situation, the Soviet Union proceeds on the basis of the new way of thinking and places in the forefront a joint search for a just resolution of international economic problems on the basis of recognizing the realities and a balance of interests. "We do not at all advocate any kind of ultraradical measure," said M.S. Gorbachev in conversation with B. Sepulveda, Mexican minister of foreign affairs, this May. "For example, we are not proposing that the economic ties that have historically developed between the developed West and the developing South, between the United States and Latin America, be destroyed. But they need to be changed, in order to escape the situation created by neocolonialism, to enable all to dispose of their own material and human resources in the interests of their own peoples."

The Soviet Union's signing of a multilateral agreement during the seventh UNCTAD to set up a common fund for raw commodities was a concrete expression its new approach to

international economic affairs. World economic security interests would only gain from this if all states, first and foremost the United States, participate in this fund.

The assistance that our country gives to the developing countries helps to overcome underdevelopment and to solve problems of socioeconomic development. In 1986 the volume of the USSR's pure economic assistance to the developing countries which come within the consideration of the United Nations amounted to R15.1 billion, which at the present exchange rate is equivalent to \$23 billion.

Huge additional reserves are needed to overcome economic backwardness and poverty, just as they are needed to solve other global problems. There is only source for this -- disarmament. There is simply no other such major reserve of new means.

Guided by new political thinking, we believe that an interlink between disarmament and development would be revealed more fully in the process of creating a nuclear-free, nonviolent and -- in the long term -- demilitarized world.

The program to free mankind from nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons by the year 2000, which was put forward in M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986, foresees the allocation of means for the purpose of social and economic development as a most important accompanying measure to agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. If the proposals set out in this statement were to be adopted, it would be possible to free billions from the military sphere.

The idea of a nuclear-free nonviolent world is acquiring realistic outlines, and it faces us increasingly starkly as the only reasonably alternative to "nuclear restraint". It is becoming increasingly evident that the policy and ideology of such restraint are restraining both disarmament and development.

The initiatives of the socialist countries, the resolutions of the Nonaligned Movement that were adopted in Harare, the appeals by states of five continents, and many UN resolutions are marked by the new thinking that overturns the cult of nuclear force.

A program for building a nuclear-free world would enable the cause of disarmament to be brought to heights which, not very long ago, it seemed unthinkable to attain. A conceptual leap was taken at the meeting in Reykjavik in October 1986; the possibility was proven in principle of large-scale accords in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

The number one question now is the elimination of two classes of nuclear arms: medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles, and the materialization of a global double-zero option.

A historic opportunity is at hand. To let it pass by would be a very major error. The international community must not allow this unique opportunity to go unexploited because of artificially created obstacles on the final stage of a long and very difficult journey.

The Soviet Union intends to continue to persistently strive for an agreement on the total elimination of medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles. But there must be no "bookkeeping of the absurd" in this, where, against the laws of arithmetic, zero plus zero equals 72 warheads, equivalent in their might to 216 Hiroshimas. It is quite obvious that it is time for the United States to display political will and responsibility and to enter the opened doorway.

One must realize that attempts to wreck the agreement may turn into vast landslides rolling back the cause of disarmament and with it also the cause of development into the abyss of confrontational stagnation.

We are also in favor of progress along all the other routes leading to a nuclear-free world. The Soviet Union is leading matters toward achieving a substantial reduction in strategic offensive armaments, establishing a strict universal ban on the deployment of any armaments in space, and strengthening the terms of reference of the ABM Treaty.

The Soviet Union persistently seeks to obtain the speediest scrapping of chemical weapons and other forms of mass destruction weaponry, and proposes that the level of conventional armaments should be lowered to the minimum necessary for defensive needs.

Renunciation of attempts at military solutions to international problems, restructuring the relationship between military and nonmilitary spheres of operation, and establishing absolute priority for peaceful values and assistance for those in need of it, bringing all areas of security -- including military-political and economic security -- together in a single entity -- all these aspects of implementing the principle of "Disarmament for Development" are organic components of the process of shaping security for all and the policy of trust, interaction, and cooperation. In their organic relationship, disarmament and development are the quintessence of a universal system of international security.

The Soviet Union has come to the conference with the firm intention of promoting an outcome that is as positive and as specific as possible. The peoples expect that it will be fruitful. This aspiration must serve as a powerful incentive in our joint work and in the implementation of the concept of "Disarmament and Development".

Gorbachev Appeal to Conference

PM251525 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Aug 87 First Edition p 1

["Appeal From the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to the Participants in the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development" -- PRAVDA headline]

[Text] I cordially greet you and express the hope that the international conference will uncover new opportunities in the approach to resolving this cardinal problem of the modern world.

The obstacles created by the opponents of disarmament along the path the conference once again confirmed the interdependence of disarmament and development and the urgency of the task.

It is time everyone realized that by leaving the peoples of certain regions and even whole continents willy-nilly in the position of exploited and deprived peoples, mankind risks causing an explosion no less disastrous than a thermonuclear clash.

The conference is opening at a favorable time for the examination of the problem -- at the point where an urgent need and available opportunities intersect. Only recently, before Reykjavik and the "global double-zero" option, this point seemed very far off. But today the roads to disarmament and to development are drawing closer together not only in wishes, but in real politics.

I have in mind the agreement which has been outlined on the total elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles, an agreement that could be signed tomorrow if the United States and the FRG removed the obstacle that everyone knows about.

I have in mind the possibility of a substantial reduction in the two biggest nuclear power strategic offensive arms in conditions of strengthening the ABM Treaty.

A certain optimism is also inspired by progress at the talks in Geneva within the framework of the Disarmament Conference, where representatives of 40 countries have come close to concluding a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles.

The principle of development through disarmament is organically built into the concept of creating a comprehensive system of international peace and security, proposed to the world community by the group of socialist countries. And the fact that this concept meets with the moral and political support of many states is something that I also count among favorable conditions for the conference's work.

Lastly, there is evidence of the heightened concern of the world public and influential political circles at the economic situation in the developing countries. Many people now see the link between their unprecedented debt -- caused by nonequivalent exchange, that new form of colonial plunder -- and the growth of the imperialist states' military budgets. The monstrous injustice of the fact that the former are to a considerable degree paying for the military expenditure of the latter is also obvious.

We and our friends propose the correct ways and means of putting an end to this situation. I hope that conference will take into account the document adopted by the socialist community countries in Berlin "On Overcoming Underdevelopment and Establishing a New International Economic Order."

The world community has a wealth of work to do in this sphere. I am convinced that the conference can make a marked and authoritative contribution to the internationalization of efforts to turn disarmament into a factor of development.

The conference participants can count on our active participation and support. The Soviet Union has already demonstrated in practice that it favors intensifying the work of international forums dealing with arms race problems, including the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

We will continue to do everything possible to strengthen the authority of the United Nations and its role in promoting development through disarmament. We believe that the UN Security Council must also get down to this in earnest.

It would be useful to discuss disarmament and development problems in principles at a special meeting of the UN Security Council states' top leaders.

Implementing the fundamental principle of "disarmament for development" must and can unite mankind and aid the formation of its worldwide consciousness.

We favor wider glasnost and openness regarding military activity and military expenditure and are persistently proposing a comparison of the military doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This will also make it possible to effect a realistic comparison of military budgets with the aim of stopping their ballooning and confining them to the level of reasonable sufficiency.

It is necessary to halt and reverse the process of militarization. The preparation by every state of a national plan for conversion, demonstrating determination to cut military production, would be an important step on this path, one that strengthens international trust.

In order to transfer funds that become available during disarmament to the countries that need them, it would be desirable to set up within the UN framework an international "Disarmament for Development" fund open to all states. The USSR is prepared to participate in such a fund.

Mankind wants to be confident that it has a future. Our decisions will help to strengthen faith in that future.

M. Gorbachev

Thanked by Perez de Cuellar

LD252021 Moscow TASS in English 1931 GMT 25 Aug 87

[Text] New York August 25 TASS -- United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar has described as extremely topical and constructive Mikhail Gorbachev's address to the international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development, currently under way at the U.N. Headquarters.

In an interview with TASS correspondent Arkadiy Sidoruk, he expressed gratitude to the Soviet leader for efforts to strengthen the prestige of the United Nations.

The U.N. secretary-general characterized as very interesting the specific proposals contained in the address for discussing problems of disarmament and development at a special summit of U.N. Security Council member states and establishing within the U.N. framework an international fund, "Disarmament for Development."

Petrovskiy Heets Press 26 August

LD261919 Moscow TASS in English 1837 GMT 26 Aug 87

[Text] New York August 26 TASS -- The Soviet delegation to an international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development, which is under way here, today held a press conference in connection with Mikhail Gorbachev's address to the forum.

Speaking at the press conference, delegation leader Vladimir Petrovskiy, a Soviet deputy foreign minister, said that the address by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee summed up the Soviet Union's approach to the problems reviewed at the forum.

The new mode of thinking adopted by the USSR in international affairs was based on the conviction that the principle of armament instead of development, a principle imposed by militarism, should be replaced with the opposite one, namely disarmament for development.

The Soviet Union, Petrovskiy said, had tabled a whole number of proposals at the conference, which were related to all its three main aspects, including the establishing of an international foundation, disarmament for development, open to all nations in U.N. frameworks, new Soviet considerations in respect of military budgets, which were a result of the policy of openness that spread to the military sphere as well, and the reiteration of the Warsaw Treaty countries' earlier proposal to the NATO members for a mutual freeze on military spending, a call for states to start drawing up national conversion plans, a proposal to the United States for joint efforts for limiting sales and deliveries of conventional arms, and, finally, Soviet ideas for releasing science and technology from the armor of secrecy.

Putting forth a program of specific actions at one with socialist countries, the Soviet Union at the same time positively treats other constructive proposals no matter from what quarter they have come, Vladimir Petrovsky pointed out. Considerations set forth by representatives of the developing countries, specifically, the document submitted by African nations are close to our hearts and minds. We have supported Italy's proposal on the establishment of an open world laboratory of scientists and inaugurated its branch in Moscow. We have been impressed by the idea put forward by France at the conference — the idea on the establishment of special units of servicemen for rendering humanitarian aid to the developing countries at their request.

We consider it to be essential that the conference end in the adoption of a tangible and substantive document. The Soviet Union is attaching exceptionally big importance to the current conference which could not get together for a long time. But finally it was convened, although the United States is regrettably boycotting it.

We are regarding this conference not as a crown but as the beginning of the process of disarmament and development — a process with which we are linking the establishment of a comprehensive system of security equal for all, Vladimir Petrovsky went on.

The participants in the press conference showed great interest in the proposal to convene the Security Council at the level of heads of state. To put the process of

transition from disarmament to development into action, Mikhail Gorbachev suggested that that issue be closely studied by the Security Council, whose task includes, as is known, the question of armaments regulation and to which the General Assembly addressed on more than one occasion with a proposal to examine disarmament issues, Vladimir Petrovsky said. The holding of such a meeting of the Security Council would promote internationalisation of the processes of disarmament and development, and active involvement in these processes of not only the main UN body for maintaining peace and security but also its other mechanisms.

Therefore, it is regrettable that the USA, one of the permanent members of the Security Council, rejected this idea outright, as they say, without even bothering to study it, the head of the Soviet delegation said.

"Of course, we understand - and this was proved in the first days of the work of the conference - that there are differences in approaches to the relationship between disarmament and development. But this is not the main thing. What matters is that all participants in the conference agree on the need to make practical actions on the implementation of the strategy of disarmament and development, which is urged by the UN. This instills confidence and hope that the work started by the conference will yield results and the process of transition from disarmament to development will become a reality of our days."

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CSO: 5200/1644

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: ROMANIA SUPPORTS USSR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT POLICY

LD240846 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 23 Aug 87

[Address by Ion Nicolae, Romanian ambassador to the USSR, given on the occasion on Romania's 43d National Day; from the "Vremya" newscast--live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Today is the national holiday of the Socialist Republic of Romania, the day of liberation from the fascist and anti-imperialist revolution, and of social and national liberation. Taking part in our program is the ambassador of Romania to the Soviet Union, Ion M. Nicolae.

[Nicolae, in Romanian fading into Russian translation] Our democratic system is constantly being improved. In the current 5-year plan, Romania will become a country with an average level of development. Romania is celebrating its national holiday while preparing for the convocation of a RCP national conference this December. Romania conducts an active foreign policy, advocating an end to the arms race and security and peaceful international cooperation. We actively support the program for gradual nuclear disarmament put forward by the USSR, and also the Soviet proposals regarding the global elimination of all medium-range nuclear missiles. At the same time we advocate implementation of an integral program for universal disarmament. In 1986 Romania reduced by 5 percent her military expenditure and numbers of troops and armaments.

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CSO: 5200/1644

USSR: GUEST COLUMNIST CALLS FOR INDIAN OCEAN CONFERENCE

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 32, 16-22 Aug 87 p 5

[Article by R. C. Rajamani under the rubric "Foreign Publicist's Column," "Conference on the Indian Ocean Needed"]

[Text]

THE IDEA to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace is more than two decades old. It was first put forward at the Second Summit of the Non-Aligned Nations held in Cairo in 1964, when Sri Lanka, then called Ceylon, mentioned the problem of the Indian Ocean. The Summit deplored the expressed intention of the extra-regional powers to establish bases in the Indian Ocean. The establishment of a nuclear free zone was also recommended.

Ever since colonial times it was believed that the Indian Ocean was exclusively "British waters". Therefore, after the disintegration of the British Empire, currency was given to the preconception of a "power vacuum", which was a signal for others to enter the area.

A symposium on the Indian Ocean last year in New Delhi was told: "The overall naval power of the littoral states was well in excess of the small complement of British naval presence. The concept of 'power vacuum' due to British withdrawal, is, therefore, patently untenable, and the concept must be viewed realistically for what it actually is - a strategy to justify and legitimize the presence of external forces in the Indian Ocean."

In 1971, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. In the following year, it established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean with a mandate to study the implications of the declaration, which had to be approved at a specially convened international conference in Colombo. While the projected international conference is still to be realized, powerful naval fleets from the Western powers, primarily the USA, reign supreme in the ocean.

The 47 member UN Ad Hoc Committee, meanwhile, has made little progress. The Western group in the committee has shown

little seriousness about assisting its work. It has been putting impractical and impossible preconditions. It requests the Soviet Union to withdraw its limited troop contingent from Afghanistan, and the like. Only in the eventuality of their preconditions being met will the Western countries agree to take part in an international conference on the Indian Ocean. This position is putting the cart before the horse. The USSR together with the other socialist countries has consistently supported the plan for a Colombo conference. Moreover, the Soviet Union joined the USA in negotiations about disarmament in the Indian Ocean in the late 1970s. These negotiations were foiled by the American side.

In his interview to the Indonesian newspaper, *Merdeka*, Mikhail Gorbachev voiced again the Soviet Union's concern over the current situation in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet leader spoke out in favour of the introduction of international guarantees for safe sea navigation in the Indian Ocean and the seas, straits and bays which are part of it. The USSR also calls for security in air traffic, for collective measures against terrorism at sea and air routes in and over the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile, recent reported developments in the Indian Ocean have caused much concern in the area. There have been reports about South African plans to use Marion Island as a nuclear testing ground. Another report concerned the French proposal to move their nuclear testing centre from the Pacific atoll of Mururoa to the islands of Kerguelen in the Indian Ocean.

All of this bears witness to attempts to turn the Indian Ocean into an area of increasing conflict. Consequently, the convocation in 1988 of an international conference acquires still greater urgency.

USSR: PRC BACKS SOVIET STANCE ON ASIAN SECURITY, INF, NFZ'S

LD261353 Moscow TASS in English 1313 GMT 26 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 26 TASS — Movement forward in all spheres of Soviet-Chinese relations towards their full normalization is an important direction in the foreign policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, Igor Rogachev, deputy foreign minister of the USSR, told a TASS diplomatic correspondent.

Establishing lasting goodneighbourly cooperation between the two major socialist countries, strengthening traditional friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples help ensure stability and security in Asia, in the Pacific region and throughout the world, the deputy minister said furthermore.

A comprehensive approach to the quest for a solution to this urgent problem was expressed in Vladivostok a year ago. The Soviet Union has recently launched a new large-scale initiative to advance those proposals. It was taken to a no small extent with due regard for the wishes and interests of many states of the Asia-Pacific region, among them China.

The point at issue is the USSR's readiness to lift the issue of retaining 100 warheads on intermediate-range missiles deployed in the Asian part of the USSR on condition that the U.S. side acts likewise. Shorter-range missiles will also be dismantled. This step by the Soviet Union was positively assessed in the PRC.

It is common knowledge that the PRC has been more active in international affairs lately. China declares for lowering on a general scale military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region and supports the proposal for establishing nuclear-free zones in the region.

It acceded to the treaty on the nuclear-free zone in South Pacific. It will be recalled that the USSR and the PRC, the two nuclear powers in Asia, pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, Rogachev stressed.

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CSO: 5200/1644

RELATED ISSUES

USSR: GORBACHEV AWARDED 1987 GREEK PEACE MEDAL

FM240635 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Aug 87 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent G. Shakhunyan dispatch under the "Reports From Abroad" rubric: "Greece: Recognition of Great Services"]

[Text] Athens -- The 1987 Peace Medal of the cultural center in the municipality of Lefkada has been awarded to M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, as a symbol of recognition of his great services in the struggle for disarmament, detente, and mutual understanding.

At a ceremony at which the medal was presented to the Soviet Embassy, S. Margellis, mayor of the city of Lefkada, stated that the policy being implemented by the Soviet leadership attests to a sincere desire to consolidate universal peace and achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons on our planet. He stressed that the persistent consistent peace initiatives and proposals emanating from Moscow match up to any optimistic thoughts and hopes about a more human future for mankind and express the aspirations of all people of goodwill for lasting peace and security.

M.S. Gorbachev's gratitude for being awarded the medal and wishes to Greek peace supporters for success in their noble movement were conveyed in response to the inhabitants and the municipality of the city of Lefkada.

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CSO: 5200/1644

XINHUA ON U.S. BOYCOTT OF UN ARMS MEETING

OW251408 Beijing XINHUA in English 1343 GMT 25 Aug 87

["Hiding its Head in the Sand — A Commentary on U.S. Boycott of U.N. Conference on Disarmament and Development (by Qian Wenrong)" — XINHUA headline]

[Text] United Nations, August 24 (XINHUA) — With the exception of the United States, delegates from some 140 countries gathered at the U.N. headquarters today to discuss disarmament and development — two vital issues facing the world.

The international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development was first proposed by French President Francois Mitterrand in 1983 and is in accordance with a resolution adopted by all U.N. members, including the United States at the 40th General Assembly in 1984.

The conference comes at a time when worldwide military expenditure has climbed close to one trillion U.S. dollars a year, some 25 times more than all the official development aid given to the developing nations.

The arms race, mainly between the two superpowers, has not only caused tension in international relations, but has also hindered the social and economic development in both the industrialized and developing countries.

The conference, the first of its kind in the four decades of U.N. history, reflects the strong desire of the world people for peace and development. They hope that through disarmament, huge financial, material and manpower resources may be diverted into development.

The U.S. boycott of the conference has aroused sharp criticism at home and abroad. Several U.N. diplomats here said that some Western nations are very angry with the U.S. decision, describing it as "defeatist".

In an article in today's *New York Times*, Edward Luck, president of the United Nations Association of the United States, warned that by its absence, the United States might turn a benign event "into a forum for grumbling about American arrogance."

The Reagan administration argues that its "non-participation in the meeting stems from our belief that the two matters (disarmament and development) are not appropriately considered in terms of their inter-relationship."

Obviously, the argument has no leg to stand on. The fact is that different views can be aired and discussed at the U.N.

Although the overwhelming majority of the member states hold that disarmament and development are two distinct processes, they are, at the same time, linked. And therefore, different views on the relationship between the two should not be used as an excuse for the boycott of the meeting.

It was reported that in a letter to U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz earlier this year, 14 members of the U.S. Congress described the Reagan administration's argument as "an oversimplification that does not reflect the complexities of global economics or security" and urged the government to reconsider its decision.

In defending its boycott, U.S. officials voiced their objection to the position of non-aligned nations, which say the superpowers should disarm first and then channel the money saved from arms cuts into economic development for the South.

The two superpowers possess the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals in the world and their military expenditure accounts for more than 60 percent of the world's total. Their spendings on the arms race have far exceeded their need for national defense and their competition poses a grave threat to world peace and social and economic development, particularly for the developing countries.

Therefore, the developing nations and all other peace-loving nations and peoples have every reason to call on the superpowers to take the lead in cutting down their military spendings and reducing armaments and to devote part of the resources released from disarmament to assisting them.

The United States' claim that the meeting would discredit Reagan's "star wars" program only shows that the Reagan administration is afraid of criticism from the international community and is bent on continuing the arms race against the Soviet Union.

Luck put it well when he said in his article, "rather than confidently setting forth its ideas and exercising global leadership, the Reagan administration is content once again to hide its head in the sand, fearful of an open competition with competing ideologies and perspectives."

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CSO: 5200/4020

PRC UN DELEGATE URGES SUPERPOWERS TO DISARM

OW260350 Beijing XINHUA in English 2346 GMT 25 Aug 87

[Text] United Nations, August 25 (XINHUA) — The chief Chinese delegate attending the international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development today called on the Soviet Union and the United States to take the lead in disarmament.

Qian Qichen, deputy foreign minister and head of the Chinese delegation, said "To safeguard world peace, it is imperative to stop the arms race and realize genuine disarmament."

He said the world is confronting with "the over-saturation of the nuclear weapons of the superpowers, their huge piles of conventional weapons, and the ever-escalating arms race and its extension from the surface of the earth, the sea and the air into outer space."

"Acts of interference and aggression and occupation of other countries' territories by force are still under way," he added.

He called on the United States and the Soviet Union to take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear and conventional armaments, and put an end to the use and threat of force.

Qian also called on the international community for peaceful solution of all international disputes and the elimination of "hot spots" and regional conflicts.

The annual military expenditures in the world totals about 1,000 billion dollars, or 1.9 million dollars per minute. It amounts to the total volume of the debt incurred by the developing countries.

Qian urged the United States and the Soviet Union to save money from the arms race and increase their help to the developing countries.

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